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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
AN EVALUATION OF TURKISH LOCAL ELECTIONS FROM SECOND ORDER 
ELECTIONS PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 
Emrah Uyar 
 
M.A in Political Science 
Spring 2009 
Thesis Advisor: Ali Çarkoğlu 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Turkey, local elections, national elections, logistic regression, second order 
elections 
 
 
The second order elections model is a useful tool to explain the dynamics of 
relationship between voting patterns at different level elections. The model envisages 
elections other than the national contests subordinate to the national elections, and calls 
them second order national contests. This study examines the patterns of relationship 
between Turkish local and national elections using the model of second order elections. 
Basic assumptions of the model; i.e. lower turnout in second order elections, dominance 
of national issues in voting decisions of voters, vote loss of incumbent parties in the 
face of rising votes for the smaller parties in second order contests, are tested using the 
data from Turkish local and national elections as well as a pre-election survey data.     
 
The inquiry is conducted at two levels: At the aggregate level average turnout rates for 
different elections are compared. Also volatility, fragmentation and Effective Number 
of Parties (ENP) indices are calculated for each election. At the individual level a 
previously conducted pre-election survey data is utilized in order to build up a logistic 
regression model. The model controls for the effects of various socio-political, 
economic, ideological and candidate variables on the decision of voters to change or not 
to change votes between a national and a local election.  
 
These analyses show that although dominated by the national issues (as expected by the 
model), local issues and candidates are important in Turkish local elections (contrary to 
the expectations) and local elections do not consistently work in favor of smaller 
parties.  
 
Rather, they fit to national electoral trends, either by validating existing political trends 
or by signaling rise of a new arrangement in the political scene. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
TÜRKİYE’DEKİ YEREL SEÇİMLERİN İKİNCİ DERECE SEÇİMLER 
PERSPEKTİFİNDEN BİR DEĞERLENDİRMESİ 
 
 
 
 
Emrah Uyar 
 
Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Bahar 2009 
Tez Danışmanı: Ali Çarkoğlu 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, yerel seçimler, genel seçimler, lojistik regresyon, ikinci 
derece seçimler 
 
 
İkinci derece seçimler modeli farklı seviyelerde yapılan seçimlerde ortaya çıkan oy 
dağılımı kalıplarının birbirileriyle ilişkisini incelemek için kullanılan faydalı bir araçtır. 
Bu modele göre genel seçimler dışındaki yarışmalar bu seçimlerin sonuçlarına doğrudan 
bağımlı oldukları için ikinci derece seçimler olarak adlandırılırlar.  Bu tez çalışmasında 
Türkiye’deki yerel ve genel seçimler arasındaki ilişki ikinci derece seçimler modeline 
göre incelenmiştir. Bu bağlamda modelin temel varsayımları; ikinci derece seçimlerde 
katılımın düşük olması, ulusal konuların seçmenlerin oy davranışında temel etken 
olması, iktidar partileri ikinci derece seçimlerde oy kaybederken küçük partilerin 
kazançlı çıkması gibi varsayımlar Türkiye’deki seçim sonuçları ve anket verileri 
kullanılarak test edilmiştir. 
 
İnceleme iki seviyede gerçekleştirilmiştir: Genel seviyede seçimlerde ortaya çıkan 
katılım oranları karşılaştırılmış, ayrıca her seçim için siyasal bölünme, seçimler arası oy 
oranlarında oynaklık ve Etkili Parti Sayısı dizinleri hesaplanmıştır. Bireysel seviyede 
daha önce yapılmış bir anketin verileri kullanılarak bir lojistik regresyon modeli 
oluşturulmuştur. Model sosyo-politik, ekonomik, ideolojik ve adaya bağlı tanımlanan 
çeşitli değişkenlerin seçmenlerin bir yerel ve bir genel seçim arasında oylarını 
değiştirme veya değiştirmeme kararları üzerindeki etkilerini kontrol etmektedir.          
 
Yapılan analizler, modelin beklentileri doğrultusunda Türkiye’de yerel seçimlerde 
ulusal konuların oy verme davranışını büyük ölçüde etkilediği, ancak modelin 
beklentilerinin tersine yerel konuların ve adayların da yerel seçimler üzerinde etkili 
olduğunu, ayrıca yerel seçimlerin modelde beklendiği gibi her zaman küçük partilerin 
iktidar partilerine karşı yüksek sonuçlar aldığı seçimler olmadığını göstermiştir.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis dissertation I want to study patterns of the relationship between 
Turkish local and national elections using the model of second order elections. The 
study will consist of two main parts, which will also be divided into two parts within 
themselves. In the literature review I will provide a general description of local 
government, elections held at the local level and their place within  democratic systems. 
(Rallings and Trasher 1997) Prior to that, however,, the main part of the review on local 
elections will be devoted to studies that investigate the relationship between local and 
national elections and especially to the second order elections model. The second order 
elections model (Reif and Schmitt 1980) is a useful tool that explains the dynamics of 
voting patterns for different levels of elections. Although the basic model is constructed 
upon European Parliament elections, second order elections may vary from local to 
regional and European Parliament elections. Due to this variability, I will review second 
order elections literature extensively, and special emphasis will be given to studies that 
analyze local elections from second order perspective like Freire (2004) and Heath et.al. 
(1999). 
 
The second part of the literature review will survey Turkish local administration 
and local electoral systems. I will first provide a brief historical introduction of the 
development of local government in Turkey (Keleş 2000, Özgür and Kösecik 2005, 
Bayraktar 2007). This part is important in order to understand the place of local 
elections in the Turkish democratic system. Points to be drawn here are the centralized 
nature of the Turkish polity and the relative unimportance of the local government; 
changes in the local administration after the 1980s; the growing importance of local 
authority as a consequence of immigration and urbanization, and the recent 
administrative reforms of 2005 that dealt with decentralization. Three levels of local 
administration in Turkey will be introduced here; namely provincial local government, 
municipalities and village administration (Polatoğlu 2000).  
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Village administration is not a concern of this study, so I will focus on provincial 
local government and municipal elections. At this point a critical evaluation of local 
elections, i.e. provincial local government and municipal elections, in Turkey will be 
made. When elections are held, what are the dominant issues during election campaigns, 
what are the electoral rules applied in local elections? Before beginning an analysis of 
elections according to second order elections model an introduction covering relevant, 
yet a very limited number of studies on local elections in the Turkish political science 
literature will be provided (Çitçi et.al. 2001, İncioğlu 2002, Kösecik 2005). This 
evaluation will portray the socio-political environment elections are held in and is 
expected to give preliminary ideas about the relationship between local and national 
elections.   
 
The second main part will be devoted to data analysis.  On the one hand, I will use 
election data, i.e. vote shares and turnout levels, at the aggregate level in order to test 
whether basic assumptions of the model hold for Turkish local elections. On the other 
hand, I will utilize  survey data at the individual level in order to see whether voters take 
local issues into account more than national issues when casting their vote for local 
elections.  
 
Basic assumptions of the second order model that will be discussed are as follows: 
i. Turnout is lower in second order elections  
ii. Minor parties gain votes against losses of the government parties in second order 
elections, but voters turn back to their original positions during the next first order 
election 
iii. Government losses are more pronounced in midterm period 
iv. Outcome is strongly related to incumbent popularity and national issues dominate 
the elections rather than election specific issues (Norris 1997). 
 
If turnout is lower in local elections, if parties in office lose votes to smaller 
parties in local elections and they lose by even more in elections held in the midterm, 
and if people are voting with national issues in their minds rather than local ones, then 
we can argue that local elections can be regarded as second order races.  
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I will use aggregate data in order to test three assumptions. The first assumption is 
the easiest to test since all studies on local elections point to the fact that turnout is 
lower in local elections. So, even before compiling all turnout data for local and 
national elections we can say that turnout is expected to be lower in local elections. 
 
In order to see if the second and third assumptions hold election data can be used. 
Comparisons of volatility, fragmentation and effective number of parties (ENP) 
indicators for local and national elections will tell us whether voters are freer in casting 
their votes in local elections.  
 
Volatility index shows the ratio of voters that changed their vote from previous 
election to the current one (Pedersen 1979). According to the second order model, we 
would expect volatility to be higher in local elections since people feel freer to vote for 
smaller parties. Volatility can also be calculated as inter-block volatility, with blocks 
constituting leftist and rightist parties, and this would show if voters shift between two 
elections from rightist to leftist parties, or vice versa.  
 
Fractionalization index (F) shows how much the electorate is divided in an 
election (Rae 1967). It is calculated using the percentage of votes for each party and 
varies between zero and one. Zero means one party gathers all votes, whereas one 
indicates the highest amount of fragmentation. ENP is calculated with the formula 1/(1-
F) and shows the number of effective parties for an election (Taagepera and Shuggart 
1989). In second order elections we would expect F to be closer to one and ENP to be 
higher when compared to national elections.  
 
In general, if local elections are second order elections, where people vote more 
freely than with regard to national elections, then it should be expected that volatility, 
fragmentation and effective number of parties should be higher for local elections. 
 
Instructive as they are, aggregate level analysis might not be sufficient to paint the 
whole picture about the relationship between local and national elections. A better study 
is possible by utilizing survey data and establishing models for voting behavior at 
different level elections. Some of the studies on second order elections do this type of 
analysis. Heath et. al. (1999) use logistic regression models that include variables like 
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government perception, previous vote and attitudes towards certain policies. They used 
data the from British Election Panel Study and found that for the 1994 elections British 
local and European Parliament elections qualified as second order elections.  Freire 
(2004) also uses individual level data from various surveys and his OLS models certify 
that Portuguese local elections, although more close to national contests than European 
Parliament elections, also show second order characteristics.  
 
In order to test the last assumption there is not enough individual level data at 
hand. Actually, it is a methodological question whether suitable survey data can be 
obtained regarding this issue because depending on the timing of the survey it is highly 
probable that answers regarding voting behavior at local and general elections would be 
contaminated by each other. If the survey is held in a time when there is no prospect of 
elections the respondents would answer according to national political concerns and 
their local voting behavior would be contaminated by national politics. On the other 
hand, if the survey is conducted near local elections the risk of contamination is the 
other way around; while answering the survey the respondent’s choice for municipal 
candidate could reflect itself as the vote choice for the general elections as well.   
 
In order not to test the second orderness directly but in order to test the factors that 
might be influential over voters in changing or not changing their vote between 
elections I will construct a binary logit model by using data from the Survey of 
Electoral Intentions conducted in December 2003 by Türkiye Ekonomik Sosyal ve 
Siyasal Araştırma Vakfı (TÜSES) and Veri Arastırma, a private research company. The 
survey is the sixth wave of a series that is conducted by the company using identical 
methodology and sampling.  Numerous books and articles are published on these data. 
(Tüses 2004) The last survey was conducted in 26 (out of 81) provinces of Turkey on a 
nationally representative sample. The original sample included 1,806 individuals at or 
above the voting age of 18 (Başlevent et. al. 2009). This model is expected to show 
which factors influence changes in voting patterns and some lessons about the nature of 
two different elections can be drawn from here.   
 
In the survey respondents are asked their last vote choice, which party they would 
vote for if national elections were held today, which party candidate they would vote for 
in municipal elections, along with a series of questions that elaborate their choice in the 
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local elections such as; “Would you vote for the party or the candidate in the local 
elections?”; “Would you vote for a party in municipal elections that normally you 
wouldn’t just because you like its candidate” and “Do you think it’s a good thing for 
your mayor to be a member of the governing party?”.   
 
Party identification, respondents’ left-right placement of themselves and 
respondents’ evaluation of the government’s economic performance are other indicators 
that can be used in the analysis. Also, the survey asks respondents about their opinions 
on the decentralization of government with two questions, “Would you prefer education 
services to be delivered by the central government or the local authorities” and “Would 
you prefer health services to be delivered by the central government or local 
authorities”. In addition, traditional demographic information can be gathered from the 
survey such as age, education, gender and religiosity.   
 
I will construct a model where the dependent variable is the vote switch between 
general and local elections. The reference category for the binary logistic model, y=0, is 
voting for the same party in local and general elections and y=1, in cases where vote 
choice for municipality elections is different from the vote choice for general elections. 
Explanatory factors are demographic variables; age, gender, education and religiosity, 
candidate identity’s effect on respondents vote choice, respondent’s economic 
evaluation of the government, left-right placement and party identification. I would 
expect that the probability of a vote switch is higher for voters who say the candidate 
himself is more important than the party of a candidate. Religiosity is expected to be 
non-influential for this case, because AKP voters tend to be more religious and AKP 
voters in the sample are as high as 60%. Negative economic evaluation of the 
government is expected to decrease the probability of voting for the same party. The 
effects of the demographic factors remain to be seen.  
 
These aggregate and individual level analyses can give us clues about whether 
local elections in Turkey are second level elections. It is expected that although some 
assumptions of the model will hold true, like lower turnover in local elections and 
dominance of national issues in the local election period, some assumptions, like small 
parties gaining votes in local elections and voters turning back to their original positions 
after voting differently in local elections is not expected to fit the Turkish case.    
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CHAPTER I:  SECOND ORDER ELECTIONS MODEL 
Voting is the basic participatory tool for democracies. Modes of democratic 
participation have expanded considerably over the years.  Conventional and 
unconventional ways of participation have appeared. Some scholars have even become 
concerned that political participation has expanded to the point that the distinction 
between political and non-political activities has become blurred (Van deth 2001). 
However, participating in the elections is still the most conventional most influential 
and one may argue fundamental way of political participation. The history of 
democracy is in a way similar to the history of polities trying to set a standard for the 
franchise vote versus people fighting to earn their right to vote. In today’s world the 
right to vote is an inalienable right of democratic citizens.  
 
Actually, the question now is not about who is eligible to vote, as virtually all 
adults are eligible, but rather it has become a question as to why people are participating 
less in elections Average turnout is in decline in most of the established democracies 
(Franklin 2004). As many cleavages like left-right, urban-rural and modern–post 
modern affect voting decisions, one of the major factors in voting is the nature and 
frequency of elections. In the US, for instance, citizens cast their vote in order to elect 
the president, state senators, governor, mayor and a vast array of city officials from the 
sheriff to the attorney general. In Europe, the number of elections is quite less. Actually, 
an average British citizen living in Oxford casts a vote four times in a five year period, 
whereas an average resident of Irvine, California has the opportunity to participate in 
elections nearly four times in a single year (Dalton 2004: 42). 
 
It has been argued that the number and variety of elections leads people to vote 
less in general in what has been called “voter fatigue”(Dalton 2004: 39-40). For this or 
that reason turnout is in decline in many democracies. Another effect of the increasing 
number of voting arenas is that voters are now choosing between elections. The number 
of elections is extremely high in the US, as mentioned, but to be frank the US is an 
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outlier in this sense. However, even when you think in the European context people 
have to cast their votes in many different electoral arenas. The previously mentioned 
Oxford resident who votes four times in five years probably had to participate in at least 
three different levels of elections; national, local and European. If he would have been a 
Spanish citizen living in Barcelona there would be an additional level, the regional one.  
 
In some elections voters don’t even care to vote, but when they participate in 
elections at different levels what is their motivation for casting their votes? What are the 
criteria for an American voter to choose party in Congressional elections? Are they 
different from the ones employed in the presidential elections? Do time span between 
two different elections matter? When a German votes in the Land elections is he really 
concerned about the Land or is he signaling parties at the federal level with his vote? 
Last but not least, do European elections have a European character or are they mere 
reflections of national political debates of each member state? 
 
Of course the answers to these questions changes from one electoral system to 
another, from one institutional setting to the other one. Together with the development 
of the political science discipline the first research on the nature of different elections 
were made in the US. In the US, congressional elections take place two years after 
presidential elections. This means that they also take place two years before new 
presidential elections. These congressional elections are called midterm elections and, 
as they are made at the exact midpoint of two presidential elections, they provide an 
excellent opportunity to see how the past election at one electoral level (in this case the 
presidential) affect another at a different level (in this case congressional), and how this 
in turn affects the next election at the first level. There is a vast literature on the 
American congressional elections (Jacobson 1992, Niemi and Weisberg 1993).  
 
The main lessons drawn from this literature are; first turnout is lower in these 
elections and second, the president’s party’s vote is lower (Reif 1985: 9). When 
government popularity indices are examined it is seen, not only in US but in 
democracies allover, that the winning party or coalition’s support shows an increase 
right after the election, then takes a dive near the midterm election period, only to surge 
to its next equilibrium near the next election. With these insights, it is not surprising that 
midterm elections in the US, which are carried out at a time the governing president’s 
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popularity has already decreased or about to decrease, reflect this trend. Reif derives the 
lesson that a midterm election loss does not predict a loss in the next election for the 
governing party (1985: 9). 
 
The main thrust of this is the assumption that voters see elections at different 
levels with different eyes and vote accordingly. They think presidential elections are 
more important than congressional elections. That’s why they show up less in 
congressional elections and vote according to their views of the current government 
rather than the credentials of the congressional candidates. Does this translate into other 
political systems? It is argued that it does under the rubric of “second order election 
model” (Reif and Schmitt 1980). 
 
This terminology was developed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) after the 1979 
European Elections in their seminal work “Nine Second-Order National Elections: a 
Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results”. Looking at the 
first European election results Reif and Schmitt argued that European elections should 
not be seen as supranational “European elections” but only as “second order national 
elections”. First order elections are the ones where national governments are elected and 
national parliament seats are distributed. General elections in parliamentary systems like 
Turkey, Britain, the Netherlands or presidential elections like the US or Costa Rica can 
be given as examples of first order national elections (Norris 1997: 111). 
 
Second order national elections on the other hand, decide outcomes of lesser 
offices like regional governments, local councils and municipal posts and these 
elections are open to the influences of national politics. In the words of Jeffrey and 
Hough, “They present voters with little extra stimulus than that with which they were 
already confronted in the first order national elections” (2003: 200). Although they base 
their model on the European elections, according to Reif and Schmitt all “by-elections, 
municipal elections, various sorts of regional elections, those to a second chamber and 
the like” should be counted as second order national elections (1980: 8). European 
elections are just another version of these second elections.  
 
Reif and Schmitt (1985: 8) emphasize that the outcome of second order elections 
are for the most part a reflection of debates and discussions in the national arena:  
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   If we want to “understand” the results of European elections, we have to bear in mind, 
just as with any other second-order election, that not only the usual array of long term 
variables influencing the vote and the short term factors of the particular second order 
arena determine the result of these elections, but that, in various ways, the political 
situation of the first-order arena at the moment when second-order elections are being 
held, plays an important, if not decisive, role in determining the results of the second-
order election.  
 
If we are to point out the basic premises of the second order model we can 
enumerate four major points: 
 
i. Turnout is lower in second order elections because “less is at stake” than 
in first order elections. 
ii. Smaller parties are likely to gain support in second order elections. There 
will be less tactical voting, because voters will feel freer to vote what is in 
their minds without the fear of wasting votes. 
iii. Governing parties are more likely to lose votes in midterm second order 
elections while the opposition gains support. 
iv. Voters are aware that although they can punish incumbents either by 
voting with their hearts in  second order elections, instead of tactical 
voting or voting for another party in order to signal grievances with 
current policies, they can return to their original positions “when it really 
matters” in the next first order election. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 200) 
 
This first/second order elections distinction is now the established framework of 
analysis for European elections. (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Marsh 1998; Jeffrey 
and Hough 2003; Hix and Marsh 2007) Marsh (1998) analyzes the relationship between 
European and national elections by replicating Reif and Schmitt’s work with four sets of 
European election results. His findings “underline essential insights of the second order 
election model” (1998: 606). There is clearly an anti-government change in the votes 
and votes shifted from bigger parties to smaller ones.  
 
One important point made by Marsh is the distinction between countries where 
parliamentary elections are about government formation, in his words alternation, like 
Britain or Germany and countries where even parliamentary elections are more about 
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expressing political identity rather than government formation, which is non-alternation. 
Actually his addition of this distinction to the analysis also verifies second order 
insights. In alternation countries where parliamentary elections have a genuine first 
order character second order effects are more stressed. However, in countries where 
even the general elections lack a first order character, i.e the Netherlands, the difference 
between national and European elections are less visible. (Marsh 1998: 606-607)   
 
In a recent article Hix and Marsh (2007) sought to find an answer to the question 
of whether or not European voters still use European elections to punish national parties 
or use their votes with European issues in mind. In their analysis of six sets of European 
elections held between 1979-2004 it appears that European elections are still considered 
by the voters to be of the second order category. According to their findings, 40% of the 
vote change between European and national elections is a consequence of the transfer of 
votes from larger parties to the smaller parties (Hix and Marsh 2007: 495). Although 
they find that anti-EU parties fare better in elections the effect of overall European 
concerns seems to be minor. Hix and Marsh conclude that “European elections should 
not be seen as solely second order national elections. However, “Europe” remains at 
best a minor element in these elections in most cases. While the EU itself has undergone 
very significant change since its first European Parliament elections in 1979, these 
general findings were as true in 2004 and they were in 1979” (Hix and Marsh 2007: 
506). 
1. Local Elections and Second Order Election Model 
Local elections are an integral part of democratic systems allover the world. Local 
governments are formed through local elections and it is argued by some scholars that 
the democratic ethos of a political system is represented through elections held at the 
grassroots level where people choose executives who run the offices that are of most 
immediate concern to them (Çukurçayır 2002, Keleş 2000, Görmez 1997). However, it 
is interesting to see that local elections all over the world are considered of secondary 
importance with respect to national contests. This is true both for the constituencies, 
 11
because turnout rates trail those of national elections, and for scholars studying electoral 
politics. It is argued that national political issues are the main determinant of voting 
behavior at the local level, rather than local issues that are ideally expected to be the 
main concern of voters (Kösecik 2005: 254).  
 
Since every year local by-elections are held in some constituencies in Britain, 
local elections literature is relatively rich in British political science. Rallings and 
Trasher in their book “Local Elections in Britain,” (1997) try to make their case for the 
importance of local elections in Britain and argue that local elections have local breadth, 
at least to some extent. On the other hand, many scholars see local elections as “little 
more than referenda on the current standing of the national political parties” (Newton 
1976 in Rallings and Trashers 1997). Another view sees local elections as “state 
sponsored public opinion polls” (Rallings and Trasher 1988 in Kösecik 2005: 254). 
Again, according to Alexander local elections can be evaluated as a vote of confidence 
by the electorate for the policies of the national government (Alexander 1982 in 
Kösecik 2005). 
  
It appears that there is a consensus on the secondary importance of local elections. 
One wonders whether this consensus is the reason for the lack of systematic studies on 
the potential link between local and national elections results. As cited above, many 
scholars argue on the case, however, the arguments are either based on how local 
elections are covered in the media on the issues debated by national parties or on the 
idea that local election results resemble national election results. However, these claims 
are not investigated in their own right most of the time (for exceptions see Freire 2004, 
Heath et.al. 1999, Rallings and Trasher 1997).  
 
Here, I would like to enter the topic of the second order elections model. The 
second order model fares successfully through many rounds of European Parliament 
elections. Yet, although the model is devised after European elections, as mentioned 
before it is not limited to European elections. All regional, local, and municipal 
elections are deemed second order elections. Surprisingly however, the second order 
election model is only limitedly used beyond European elections. This is all the more 
surprising when we consider that the very first study on the relationship of different 
levels of elections in the European scene was made in 1977 by the German political 
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scientist Rainer Dinkel (1977), who studied the relationship between German Land 
elections and federal elections.  
 
Dinkel tested the hypothesis that in Germany parties in the federal government 
suffer losses in regional elections. He calculated “expected vote share” for parties in the 
Land elections. Expected vote share for a party in a given Land is the average of that 
party’s vote in two consecutive federal elections in that Land. If a party had 40% in a 
Land in one federal election and 30% in the next one, then the expected vote share for 
the party in the regional Land election is 35%, the average of two federal elections. He 
found that in almost all instances federal government parties fared worse than expected 
in the Land elections. Dinkel also checked for electoral cycle effects and found that 
federal government parties performed worse when Land elections were in the midterm. 
Government parties still underperform in regional elections, but when regional elections 
are held at the beginning or at the end of the electoral cycle their losses are less than in 
midterm elections. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 201) 
 
Despite this early first attempt, the literature analyzing second order elections 
other than the European elections has been barren until recently. Most of the few studies 
treating local elections as second order elections use British election data. McLean et. 
al. for instance, differentiates between second order elections and argues that “some 
second order elections are more second order than others” (1996: 4).  
 
Another study by Heath et. al (1999) similarly argued that the second order 
election model applies to British local elections, albeit with less force than it applies to 
European elections. I find Heath et. al.’s contribution to the literature especially 
important because they employ individual level survey data in their analysis which is 
lacking both in the initial analysis of Reif and Schmitt and in most of the ensuing 
literature. Studies on second order elections are mostly working on aggregate election 
data and this is a weakness for a model that bases itself on assumptions about individual 
voting behavior. Heath et. al.’s study confirms aggregate level results at the individual 
level, however with a modification: British voters consider local elections as less second 
order than European elections because “more is at stake” in local elections (Heath et. al. 
1999: 406).       
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Recently it has been discovered that the second order election model could be 
useful in studying elections in multilevel (federal) systems. European Urban and 
Regional Studies Journal devoted a specific issue to multilevel electoral competition 
(2003 vol. 10(3)) In many articles in that issue the second order election model was 
used in order to explain the relationship between regional and national elections. Jeffrey 
and Hough (2003) reemployed Dinkel’s methodology in order to compare election 
results in two countries, Germany and Spain. They also used a dissimilarity index in 
order to measure how much the vote share of each party differed from national to local 
elections.   
 
Jeffrey and Hough found limited support for the second order election model with 
German and Spanish data. In Spain, the federal government party received less than the 
expected vote share, as calculated with Dinkel’s method. However, contrary to 
expectations, they fared better in midterm elections than at other times. Also, opposition 
parties recieved nearly the same amount of votes as the governing parties and they did 
worse in midterm elections, although they were expected to do well (Jeffrey and Hough 
2003: 202-204). In Germany, on the other hand the data confirms Dinkel until 1990. 
Yet, after reunification the east-west cleavage gained significance. After 1990 federal 
parties performed worse in regional elections, not because the opposition did well, but 
rather because smaller parties outperformed themselves as defenders of territorial 
interests. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 204-205) 
 
Authors conclude that in places where territorial cleavages are not deep regional 
and general elections show similar patterns and as predicted by the second order 
election model regional election results are mainly subject to developments in the 
national arena. On the other hand, where territorial homogeneity is lost and regions are 
more vocal about their demands, which may include demands for independence as,in 
Spain, then the second order character of regional elections is diminished. Regional 
concerns become more dominant in determining election results. Moreover, even within 
the same country some regional elections carry second order election character, whereas 
some of them differentiate themselves from the yoke of the national arena and operate 
under a dominant regional logic. (Jeffrey and Hough 2003: 210-211). 
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“In sum, the obvious analytical lens for exploring regional elections, that of 
‘second orderliness’ is found wanting. Regional elections are evidently less open to 
domination by statewide debates than, say, European or local elections” (Jeffrey and 
Hough 2003: 211). 
 
Although the conclusion they have reached seems plausible a methodological note 
should be made on Jeffrey and Hough’s study. Different research supports the idea that 
second orderliness of different elections may change, however Jeffrey and Hough’s 
study is marred with methodological and data problems in reaching this conclusion.  
 
First of all, Dinkel’s model is a very simplistic one with only one explanatory 
variable. At a time when the electoral process is becoming more diverse and 
complicated it is naïve to use Dinkel’s methodology and to explain this complex 
relationship between voters and multilevel administrative units.  
 
More importantly, Jeffrey and Hough arbitrarily choose four Autonomous 
Communities of Spain, namely Castilla-La-Mancha, Catalonia, Galicia and 
Extremadura and analyzes their election results. Spain has 17 Autonomous 
Communities and we are not presented with any justification as to why these four 
communities are included in the study. Probably, if the analysis is made with election 
results from all communities we would see a different picture, one where the second 
order character of regional elections is more pronounced with some regional 
modifications.       
 
As more studies are done on local and regional elections as second order elections 
it becomes apparent that “not all second order contests are the same” (Rallings and 
Trasher 2005). Parliamentary and/or presidential elections have supremacy over others 
because “more is at stake”, yet it is rational to expect a rank-order between different 
second order elections and research seems to support this argument. Also in multilevel 
systems it is possible that different regions show different characteristics in the same 
second order election.  
 
Pallarés and Keating (2003) in their study of Spanish elections find that the 
second order model holds to a great extent for the Spanish case, albeit with some 
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modifications. Especially in Catalonia and in the Basque country regional concerns are 
more emphasized than national ones. This leads Pallarés and Keating to conclude that 
although the second order model generally holds true, “there is a constant interaction 
between the two levels and, while state-level arena and party system may be dominant, 
it has been conditioned in important ways by the process of decentralization” (2003: 
252). Recently new works appeared surveying the applicability of second order election 
model to local elections outside Britain (Freire 2004) and some others compared 
different second order elections with each other (Skrinis and Teperoglou 2006).  
 
With respect to treating local elections as second order two studies especially 
stand out: Freire (2004) and Heath et. al.(1999). Before turning to local elections in 
Turkey I would like to discuss Freire extensively because I borrowed a great deal of his 
methodology in my analysis of Turkish local elections. Freire, in his article titled 
“Second Order Elections and Democratic Cycles in Democratic Portugal” first describes 
the party system and electoral system in Portugal and then compares national elections, 
European Parliament elections and local elections in Portugal using a number of tools.  
He uses these tools at two levels: In the aggregate level he compares turnout rates and 
volatility in the electoral system for different level elections. At the individual level he 
constructs an OLS model that measures the impact of ideological and socio-
demographic factors in different level elections. Finding that ideological and socio-
demographic factors are more successful in explaining national elections, he concludes 
that people are more likely to change their votes in second order elections. I will use a 
similar methodology in the ensuing analysis in order to distinguish between first and 
second order elections. But before that I shall discuss literature on local elections in 
Turkey.         
2. Local Elections Literature in Turkey 
The picture drawn in the literature for local elections in the world is more or less 
the same for Turkey. Turnout rates are lower for local elections in Turkey as they are in 
other parts of the world. According to Çitçi (1989, 1996) voting behavior at the local 
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level is determined by national political concerns; Falay et. al. (1996) argues that 
conducting all local elections (municipality, headsman, provincial local government 
elections) in one day keeps voters out of focus on the local agenda and voting according 
to the national agenda becomes more convenient. According to Kalaycıoğlu (1994) the 
distribution of municipalities in local elections and the distribution of MPs in national 
elections resemble each other, and this leads one to question the locality of local 
elections (cited in Kösecik 2005). Similarly, İncioğlu (2002) points out that local 
election results fit into national patterns until joint elections in 1999. These analyses 
describing the relative unimportance of local elections in the face of national elections 
partly reflect global patterns, but also point to the centralist tendencies of the Turkish 
state and the weakness and unimportance of local government, and hence the 
unimportance of local elections (Polatoğlu 2000, Bayraktar 2007).  
 
When we look at the literature on Turkish politics it is seen that studies on local 
elections are conspicuously scarce.  Actually we can talk about a scarcity of studies on 
elections in general in the Turkish political science literature (Sayarı and Esmer 2002) 
and an incredibly small amount of that limited literature is devoted to local elections.  
Nonetheless, a review of the existing literature on local elections follows.  
 
Özcan (2000) looks at determinants of voting behavior at the individual level by 
analyzing data from the 1987 and 1991 national elections and the 1989 local elections in 
İstanbul.  Özcan does not include variables to distinguish between national and local 
elections and finds that some variables (previous vote choice and religiosity) affected 
voting behavior in the 1987 national and 1989 local elections. His predictions for the 
1991 elections included many more socio-economic variables including, inter alia, age, 
region of birth, political attitudes and father's education. The main argument of Özcan's 
paper is that early socialization and previous party preferences have an effect on voting 
behavior. Özcan not only argues that the same variables affect voting behavior at 
different level elections, but also does not care to differentiate between national and 
local elections in his models.   
 
İncioğlu (2002) provides an overview of local administration in Turkey and then 
makes a descriptive analysis of electoral behavior in the 1999 local elections for a 
number of selected provinces. These elections are important in the sense that in 1999 
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local and national elections were held at the same time. According to her inferences 
from this descriptive analysis, in some provinces where there is a strong İslamist 
contender national and local vote choices differ, but in provinces where centralist 
parties compete local vote preferences parallel national preferences.  
 
Akarca and Tansel (2006) analyze the role of the economy in Turkish elections by 
using results from national and local elections together.  With a sample of 25 national, 
local and by-elections they  investigate the effect of economic variables on voting 
behavior and find that Turkish voters take economic factors into account in their vote 
choices, but only look one year back when making their assessment. They also find that 
incumbents lose votes in elections due to the depreciation of their political capital and, 
more importantly, that opposition parties gain more votes in local and by-elections since 
voters use these elections as an opportunity to diffuse power.    
 
In a recent study Çulhaoğlu (2007) investigates the determinants of turnout in 
national and local elections. Her models test how socio-economic, institutional and 
party system variables determine turnout in national and local elections. She finds an 
increasing impact of socio-economic variables for election turnout in all types of 
elections. Although turnout for local elections is traditionally lower, Çulhaoğlu points to 
similar patterns of fluctuation observed in the turnout for both national and local 
elections.  
 
Other than these analytical studies the works of Tuncer (1994), Tuncer and 
Kasapbaş (2000, 2004) and Turan (2008) are important for local elections literature. 
These studies are invaluable data sources for Turkish local elections. Tuncer (1994, 
2000) and Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004) provide detailed data at the provincial level for 
1994, 1999 and 2004 local elections, respectively. Turan (2008) gives an overview of 
local elections since Turkey’s first elections, gives general data for each election like 
overall vote shares, mayorships, and the number of municipal parliament members won 
by each party for the three big cities of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Turan also describes 
the socio-economic and political developments of each election period and gives 
anecdotal evidence as to why the winners and losers of elections won and lost votes. As 
valuable as they are, these studies, especially Tuncer's, are nothing but compilations of 
data on local elections. They document rather than analyze local elections. 
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The same problem that I already cited surfaces here as well. We do not have 
systematic studies on the nature of local elections. That is to say, we do not know 
whether local elections precede or succeed national patterns nor we do we know if there 
are common factors shaping voting behavior in all local elections.  Furthermore, we also 
don’t know if there are election specific factors influential at different levels in different 
elections unless studied within a common model.  Unless studied at the level of 
individual survey data, it is also unclear whether voters cast their ballots in local and 
national elections with the same determining factors in mind. I believe that the second 
order elections model, which I already elaborated above, can be a useful tool in order to 
study the relationship between local and national elections. 
 
Before analyzing Turkish local election patterns with respect to national elections 
and how they fit the second order elections model, I should give a historical analysis of 
the Turkish local administration and the development of legislation on local 
administrations both in terms of structure and electoral rules.  This is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
 19
CHAPTER II:  LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN TURKEY AND LOCAL 
ELECTIONS  
In this chapter I will present a portrait of local administration in Turkey. The 
presentation will start with the historical development of local administration, followed 
by a description of its bureaucratic structure.  These are important in order to determine 
the importance of local government and hence the importance of local elections in 
Turkey. Related to local elections the basic characteristics of the electoral system in 
local elections will also be introduced in the last part of the chapter. This will prepare 
the ground for an analysis of local election results  compared to national elections at the 
aggregate level.  
1. Historical Development of Local Administration in Turkey 
Any study on the history of local administration in Turkey is bound to start with 
the historical legacy of the Ottoman era and the bureaucratic state tradition coming from 
that period. The dominant centralist state structure and its effective control of other 
sources of power is often mentioned in terms of a center-periphery duality with 
differing visions of the state and modernization (Mardin 1973). Heper (1985, 1997) also 
asserts the same point. According to him “the Ottoman political system evinced 
characteristics neither of patriomonialism nor of different versions of feudalism. The 
system had unmistakable signs of bureaucratic centralism-domination, if not a 
smothering, of civil society” (1997: 26).  
 
These features also translated into a lack of local administration in the Ottoman 
times; until the nineteenth century there was nearly no interaction between the center 
and the periphery in the Ottoman Empire. (Keleş 1992 in Çelenk 2009: 46) The local 
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affairs were run by unofficial networks and the state’s interest in local affairs was 
limited to tax collecting and conscription at times of war. The occurrence of local 
administrative bodies was only seen in the nineteenth century after the Empire decided 
to open itself to the world both politically and economically. One should also note the 
effect of the creation of corporate local administration bodies by Western powers 
aiming to strengthen the status of religious minorities in the Empire (Heper 1997: 27).  
 
Local administrative councils were established and strengthened after the 
Tanzimat Edict of 1839.  However, the first municipality was only established in 1855 
in Istanbul and its council members and head were appointed by the central 
government.  It was not until 1913 that provincial administrations acquired a corporate 
status (Heper 1997: 26). According to Ortaylı (2000) “the local administrative 
institutions were the product of efforts by the central bureaucracy to establish more 
efficient political control over empire” and according to Köker (1995) “the local 
assemblies were primarily loyal to the centre instead of the local community” (cited in 
Çelenk 2009: 46). Decentralization did not go beyond ‘deconcentration,’ in the words of 
Heper (1997), and this was evinced in the Municipal Law of 1877 which “established a 
tutelage over local administrative bodies and perceived them as an extension and 
representative of the central authorithy” (Ortaylı 2000, cited in Çelenk 2009: 46).      
 
This was not much of a tradition to be transferred from the Empire to the newly 
established Turkish Republic. The status of local administration in the Turkish Republic 
shows some continuity in that local goverments are weak.. This continuity was further 
reinforced by a group of ruling elites with a mindset that was skeptical of society’s 
ability to govern itself. In the words of Ataturk “there is a need at the beginning of any 
understanding, to go not from below upwards but from above downwards” (quoted by 
Rustow 1991, cited in Bayraktar 2007). 
 
Against this backdrop, at the very beginning of the republic, actually before the 
declaration of the republic, there was a short period of local administrative autonomy 
that had never been enjoyed before. The 1921 constitution envisaged an autonomous 
local administration. Accordingly, departments and villages were to be administered by 
local councils which were selected for two years and appointed their own presidents. 
These bodies were responsible for arranging public services related to local foundations, 
 21
education, health, economy, agriculture and charity (Bayraktar 2007). This rather 
unusual arrangement of local administration, however, was not long lived and with the 
new constitution of 1924 these regulations were altered in favor of the central authority. 
According to Bayraktar (2007) this exceptional situation occurred because of the 
dominance of local notables in the First Assembly. The center took the ropes of power 
into its own hands after elections were held and the Second Assembly had convened in 
1924. The Law on Villages was accepted in 1924. The idea was to draft separate laws 
for different levels of local administration but later this idea was dropped.  Instead, a 
universal municipal law was accepted and came into effect in 1930. This law stayed in 
effect for 75 years until it was replaced in 2005.  
 
According to many sources this law was designed as a municipal system that was 
an extension of the central government responsible for carrying out public services at 
the local level. The municipal system was structured at three levels; provincial local 
administration, municipalities and villages. A uniform municipal structure was set up in 
the whole country regardless of cultural, economic or geographic differences. The law 
stipulated numerous duties for local administrations like urban infrastructure, town 
planning, control of clean food, health services, cultural activities, housing etc. 
However local bodies were never endowed with the necessary material and human 
capital to fulfill these duties. Local resources were transferred to the central authority 
and distributed from there to municipalities; the planning and funding of public works 
was carried out by state agencies like the Bank of Municipalities (Bayraktar 2007).  
 
Local governments were subject to directions from several ministries and had 
nearly no chance of doing something on their own due to lack of resources and 
authority. The system was based on the “principle of delegation not devolution”. Even 
mayors needed to be approved by the Interior Ministry in order to be sworn in and start 
their job. Accordingly, the center held the idea that “the central and local governments 
together formed a unified entity” (Heper 1997: 28). Of course this entity was to be 
controlled by the center and local administrative bodies were banned from making 
decisions on political issues by the 1930 Municipal Law.  
 
Multi-party elections were introduced in 1946, however, not much changed to 
adapt the local administration to the multi-party system. In fact, local administrations 
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were tied more closely to the bureaucratic control of the center. Until the 1970s, 
officials in control of local administrations and the governing party often belonged to 
the same party. When the municipality was not from the government party, then the 
system added partisan political pressures onto the already tight central control which 
enfeebled local administration.     
 
After the military coup of 1960 a new constitution was established in 1961. This 
constitution, as it did in other parts of the administrative system, brought about 
significant changes in local administration. However, a question mark remained 
whether the spirit of the constitution could be transferred to the actual functioning of 
local administration through the necessary laws and regulations. The 1961 constitution 
called for the separation of central and local government. It was the 1961 constitution 
that regulated local administrations as constitutional bodies. (Turan 2008: 103) One of 
the most significant changes was the abolition of direct control by the central 
government over the local government and the commissioning of an independent 
judiciary for the inspection local authorities.  The 1961 constitution foresaw 
decentralization and greater autonomy for local administrations. For instance, until 1963 
mayors were elected by municipal councils that could take office only after the 
president ratified the selection after it was offered to him by Ministry of Interior Affairs. 
This was subsequently changed and mayors began to be elected directly by the 
electorate (Turan 2008: 104). Though symbolic, this shows the new constitution’s 
vision of local administration. That said, this does not change the fact that changes 
introduced by the new constitution were mainly symbolic and far from creating a truly 
decentralized local administration.        
 
According to the constitution, “the administration formed a whole with its 
organization and functions and the centre-local relations were based on the principle of 
deconcentration”. This principle allowed the center to have branches at the local level 
that would act on behalf of the center along with elected local bodies (Çelenk 2009: 47). 
According to Heper central governments were only interested in local governments to 
the extent they could contribute to national economic development (1997: 29-30).  Also, 
with the new planned economic policy put forth by the central government increasing 
amounts of public spending was undertaken with the help of the new local branches of 
the central government. From 1960 to 1972 the share of the local governments within 
 23
total public revenues decreased from 16,35% to 5,67%. In the urban planning area, the 
responsibility of local government regarding public works and urbanism were 
transferred to the central authority (Bayraktar 2007).  
 
In the 1970s persisting problems of local administration became more and more 
severe. There are a couple of reasons for this. First of all, Turkey had been urbanizing at 
high rate since the end of World War II.  In 1975 the proportion of population living in 
municipalities, that is the urban population, had reached 57%.  In comparison it was 
only 23% in 1927. During the same  period of nearly 50 years, the number of 
municipalities increased from 460 to 1654 (Heper 1997: 29).  In spite of this the basic 
legislation of the 1930 Municipal Law stayed intact.  The ratio of municipal revenues to 
public revenues stayed the same, meaning that despite the increasing number of 
municipalities no new revenue had been generated for local administrative bodies.  The 
economic and legislative arrangements were far from responding to the rapidly 
urbanizing society and this exacerbated the problems of municipalities.  
 
Moreover, especially in the second part of the 1970s cohabitation occurred; the 
municipalities of big cities were captured by center-left parties whereas the government 
was most of time in the hands of center-of-the-right coalition parties. In this context, the 
traditional ignoring of the local administration by the government turned into a 
competition between different political fractions. This led to an increase of 
administrative tutelage of the center over municipalities. The answer to problem was the 
new municipalism movement born from a collective effort of a number of social 
democratic mayors.  This movement aimed to include all social classes into the decision 
making process and asked for devolution rather than the delegation of power.  However, 
this movement turned out to be unfruitful and when we came to 1980 municipalities 
were gripping with increasing “urban problems, inadequate resources and domineering 
central governments” (Heper 1997: 30) 
 
The new political system initiated after the 1980 military coup brought further 
centralization in every aspect of political life, including local administration at the 
beginning. However, after the return to a multi-party system and the start of the 
Motherland Party government in 1983, a relative strengthening of municipalities in 
terms of authority and financial resources was observed. For instance, the financial 
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resources of municipalities were doubled between 1980 and 1986, and tripled between 
1980 and 1993, rising from 4.65% to 13.4% of national budget (Bayraktar 2007). One 
should note that these financial resources were still in control of the central government. 
As a result the autonomy of the municipalities was linked to whether the government 
party in office was also in the municipal executive. In the case of cohabitation, as it was 
seen in the 1970s, the central authority turned the screws to limit the acting space of the 
municipalities. 
 
One of the most important developments of the post-1980 period was the creation 
of metropolitan municipalities in 1984 (Heper 1987). Metropolitan municipalities were 
first established in the most populous urban centers of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir and 
then gradually their numbers increased. Currently there are 16 metropolitan 
municipalities. The Metropolitan Municipalities Law of 1984 brought a two-tiered 
municipal administration. District municipalities were preserved but above districts a 
new Metropolitan municipality was erected. Additional resources and services, some 
from the central government like Interior Ministry and Ministry of Reconstruction and 
Resettlement and some from the districts, were transferred to metropolitan 
municipalities (Çelenk 2009: 48). Also, the same law that created metropolitan 
municipalities gave the right to prepare and approve urban plans.   
 
The 1990s and 2000s passed with debates and attempts on the decentralization of 
local administration. Some of these attempts succeeded, while others remained mere 
proposals. In 1998, the Prime Ministry tried to introduce a “Draft Law on Public 
Administration Reform,” however, this did not go anywhere. Another draft was 
introduced in 2001, however, this draft also could not be debated in the parliament 
before the elections. The main objection during public debates on these drafts was the 
claim that these reform attempts were harming the unitary structure of the state. 
Decentralization is seen not from the perspective of local democracy, but rather from 
the perspective of maintaining the territorial integrity of the state. Similar concerns were 
also voiced during debates on the draft law on public administration reform in 2003 
(Çelenk 2009). However, this time the reform draft was voted on in parliament and 
accepted. Although vetoed by the president after this initial acceptance, this reform 
draft, which was actually a series of laws on SPAs, municipalities, metropolitan 
municipalities and Basic Principles of Public Administration and Its Reformation, 
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finally came into effect and it appears as the single most important attempt to reform 
and democratize the local administration of Turkey. With these laws the tutelage of the 
center was alleviated, the resources of local administrations have expanded and various 
units within local administrative bodies have been strengthened and become more open 
to participation (Turan 2008: 377-382) 
2. Structure of Local Administration in Turkey 
There are three layers of local administration in Turkey: Special provincial 
administrations (SPA), municipalities and villages.  
 
Special provincial administration represents the hand of the central government in 
the local arena. In each province, which currently amounts to 81, SPAs are established. 
They are charged with assisting central government agencies at the local level. SPA has 
an idiosyncratic structure constituted with a mixture of local elections and appointments 
by the center. It consists of the Provincial General Council and the Provincial Standing 
Committee. The Provincial General Council members are elected by popular vote from 
districts and the number of members to be elected from each district is determined 
according to the population of the district.  Elections for Provincial General Council are 
held together with municipal elections.  The Provincial General Council convenes once 
a year in order to decide and control yearly public services to be provided and approves 
the budget.  
 
The Provincial Standing Committee is the executive branch of the Special 
Provincial Administration. The Standing Committee consists of members elected by the 
General Council from among its members. This committee examines accounts and 
controls the operations of public services.  The governor is an important part of the 
provincial administration because it is the representative of the center. Governors are 
appointed by the center to each province, they are not popularly elected and until the 
massive changes in the local administration in 2005, the governor was the natural 
president of the Provincial General Council. Also, until the aforementioned changes 
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were made in the law, the decisions of the General Council and the Standing Committee 
was subject to approval by the governor (Polatoğlu 2000: 158).  Until recently, a local 
branch, whose members are popularly elected, was subject to government tutelage. 
Although it has a secondary role SPA has many duties, which are comfortably 
conducted by municipalities as in any other established democracy. The duties of a SPA 
are to help build roads, bridges, hospitals, various educational facilities, establish 
chambers, open bazaars, exhibitions etc. (Bindebir 2004: 16-17). However, until 
recently the financial resources of SPAs were insufficient in allowing them to fulfill 
these duties.   
 
In the new Special Provincial Council Law accepted by the National Assembly in 
2005 natural presidency of the governor is abolished, it is stipulated that the General 
Council chooses its president among its members. Also the obligation of approval of the 
governor for General Council decisions is abolished. Another change is made in the 
Basic Principles of Public Administration and its Reformation Law also came into 
effect in 2005. According to the provisions of this law all local branches of the central 
administration are to be abolished and all their duties together with their budget, 
revenues, physical resources and properties will be handed over to the Special 
Provincial Administration. This is seen as an important step in creating a new local 
administration that is more autonomous and more open to citizen participation (Tuncer 
2008: 377-378).        
 
The first Turkish municipality was established during the Ottoman Empire in 
Istanbul in 1854. It was the municipality of Pera, a non-Muslim foreigner dominated 
county of Istanbul, which at the time was the most urban part of the town. In fact,  14 
municipalities were planned for Istanbul at the time, but due to fiscal difficulties only 
one could be established.  At the time  the municipality of Pera was justified  because 
the area was populated with people who would appreciate the value of municipal 
services (Turan 2008: 3). This establishes a very good example of how the state in 
Turkey sees and organizes local administration. Although many municipalities were 
established in the following years it was in the Republican era that municipalities had a 
special law.  The Municipal Law was ratified in 1930 and remained in effect until 2005.  
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According to Turkish law municipalities are local authorities established to run 
local services in areas with more than a population of 2000 (Bindebir 2004: 18). 
Districts are also eligible to set up municipalities regardless of their population. The 
number of municipalities in 2005 was slightly over 3200 (Sağbaş et.al. 2005: 2).  The 
distribution of these municipalities can be found in the table below. However, this 
number has dwindled recently. In March 2009, the government accepted a law that 
abolishes municipalities in places where the population has dropped to under 2000 
according to the last census. The same law also foresees merging some smaller districts 
with bigger ones and creating some new districts. According to this some 836 
municipalities are supposed to be abolished.  
 
However, this law was accepted just before the local elections and most of the 
municipalities applied to the court and retained their municipal status for the 2009 local 
elections, arguing that they already had the status at the time the local elections process 
had started.  The High Court upheld this appeal and decided for elections to be held in 
the municipalities that are supposed to be abolished. According to Erdem (2009) there 
were 3225 municipalities before the aforementioned law had been accepted. After the 
law the number of municipalities was suppose to decrease to 2247.  However, after the 
appeals by the abolished municipalities and the decision of the High Court to uphold 
these appeals,  the 2009 local elections were conducted in 2941 municipalities.  
According to the numbers of Ministry of Interior there are 2948 municipalities in total 
after the last arrangements. 
Table 1: Number of Municipalities in Turkey 
Type of Municipality Number 
Metropolitan 16 
Metropolitan District 143 
Province 65 
District 749 
Urban zone 1.975 
Total 2.948 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior – General Directorate for Local Authorities (www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr) 
 
The rights and duties of municipalities are counted as follows in Bindebir (2004: 
18); 
Municipalities are authorized: 
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- To impose and enforce rules and municipal prohibitions where prescribed 
by law, 
- To punish those violating the prohibitions, 
- To collect municipal taxes, duties and fees, 
- To set up drinking water, city gas, electricity and transport facilities and 
networks or transfer their operational rights 
- To run transport vehicles within the municipal borders.  
 
In order to provide these services municipalities seek revenues from various local 
sources like municipal taxes, local property tax, revenues from rents and enterprises, 
government transfers and loans. Bindebir provides the ratio of 80% of municipality 
revenues coming from the central government. 42% of municipality revenues come 
only from central government tax revenue shares (Bindebir 2004: 6-7). Loans for 
municipalities are mostly provided by İller Bankası, or the Bank of Provinces. This 
bank is not a commercial bank but it is a state agency established solely for the purpose 
of providing preferential loans to municipalities.  Also many municipal taxes are subject 
to the approval of the central government, which increases the reliance of local 
administrations on the central authority. 
 
The smallest local administrative organ, after the villages, is the urban zones 
(belde in Turkish), then comes districts and the biggest local administration units is the 
province. There are 892 districts and 81 provinces in Turkey as of 2004. Nearly 2000 
municipalities consist of what are called urban zone municipalities with a population of 
close to 2000. Some of the provinces are organized as metropolitan municipalities. A 
province has to have a population of more than 750,000 inhabitants in order to be a 
metropolitan municipality. Districts under these metropolitan municipalities are called 
metropolitan districts. Metropolitan municipalities have a more centralized structure and 
are empowered to discuss and approve some of the decisions of metropolitan district 
municipalities (Tuncer and Kasapbaş 2004: 7-13).  
        
A municipality consists of a Municipal Council, a Municipal Standing Committee 
and a Mayor (Polatoğlu 2000: 158).  
 
The Municipal Council is the policy making body of the municipality elected by 
popular vote. The council has the power to approve the municipal budget and table a 
“vote of confidence” on the mayor. The Standing Committee consists of municipal 
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bureaucrats and members of the council and acts as the executive body of the 
municipality. Lastly, the mayor is the executive of the municipality directly elected by 
the people.  The mayor “prepares the budget, enforces municipal ordinances and 
regulations, manages public properties and carries out other duties assigned to him by 
the municipal council” (Polatoğlu 2000: 159). Mayors are the most powerful public 
figures in the municipalities. Their power and influence has increased since the 
implementation of direct mayoral elections in 1963.  After the reforms in the 1980s 
mayors came to resemble presidents in a presidential system of government with 
considerable administrative as well as financial powers (Bayraktar 2007).  Successful 
metropolitan mayors found themselves to be important political figures in the national 
arena and their rise from  local politics to top national posts became frequent.   
3. Characteristics of Elections and Electoral System in Local Elections 
Given this backdrop local elections in Turkey are characterized by a number of 
features. Çitçi et.al. (2001) investigated local elections from 1963 to 1999 because 
relevant data is only available after the 1963 local elections. Before that time it is 
impossible to find country wide data on local elections. According to Çitçi et.al. 
 
- All local elections are dominated by national elections. Although election specific 
issues maintain considerable space along with the candidate and local issues, 
national issues are always the main determinate of elections. 
- Very few parties prepared election manifestos specifically for local elections.  
- Local election campaigns are mainly run by party leaders, not by local candidates. 
- In the period 1963-77 local elections were evaluated as indicators of upcoming 
national political developments and used as instruments in the formation of 
government in the national arena.  
- In the period after 1984, local elections are not seen as instruments of shaping the 
national arena, but they are seen merely as public opinion polls for the parties. 
- In each period local elections reflect the national political arena: In the 1960s two 
big parties, AP and CHP, dominated the polls; in the 1970s the political structure 
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began to fragment; after the 1980 coup local elections reflect the constant shake 
up in the political system with the rise and fall of different parties. 
 
In general, turnout for national elections appear to be higher than turnout for local 
elections. (2001: 2-4, also Kösecik 2005) 
 
Historically there were different electoral rules applied for different local offices 
at different levels. For municipal councils a plurality system was used until 1963.  Until 
the 1946 elections for Provincial General Council were double degree double ballot 
votes. Mayors were elected with double degree vote until 1963; Municipal council 
members voted for the mayor after the council was elected with a majority vote. After 
the 1961 constitution elections for mayor were held using the single ballot majority 
formula, whereas provincial council and municipal council elections were held with 
proportional representation using the D’Hondt formula. All types of local elections 
including those for headman, municipality and provincial council were conducted 
together. Local elections were held every five years. 
 
In the 1982 constitution these formulas were retained and currently they are still 
in effect. Also, a constituency barrage was introduced after 1982. This barrage is not a 
fixed percentage, like the 10% threshold in the legislative elections but rather a ratio. 
Candidates who garnered less than one tenth of the votes in an electoral district are 
excluded from the ballot.  Seats are then distributed to the remaining candidates in 
proportion to their votes. This regulation is still in use.       
    
Currently, local elections are conducted according to the provisions of the Local 
Elections Law at three levels: SPA, municipality and village: Provincial general council 
elections for SPA; municipal council and mayoral elections for the municipality; 
headsman and council of the elderly for the village. Headmen are elected at the village 
level. SPA elections are held on a provincial basis since there is one SPA in each of 81 
provinces. Until 2005, the appointed governor was the head of the SPA, but with the 
changes in the law the head of SPA is now elected from among the members of the 
elected Provincial general council by the council itself (Turan 2008: 378). At the 
municipality level council members and the mayor are elected.  
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In the provincial general council elections each district is accepted as an electoral 
district. These are multi-member districts with a minimum of 2 members. The number 
of members for each district is determined according to population. İstanbul has 225 
members in total, whereas Bayburt province has a total of 8 members. In total, there are 
3208 members of the provincial council from 81 provinces. (Tuncer and Kasapbaş 
2004: 8)  
 
In municipal elections urban zones (“belde” in Turkish), districts, provinces 
and/or metropolitan provinces are each separately accepted as an electoral districts for 
mayoral and municipal council elections. The number of municipal council members 
ranges from 9 to 55 depending on the population of the municipality. In 2004 there were 
34537 members elected in 3209 electoral districts. (Tuncer and Kasapbaş 2004: 8) 
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CHAPTER III:  ANALYSIS of LOCAL ELECTIONS at the AGGREGATE 
LEVEL  
In the first chapter I presented a theoretical model  which was followed in the 
second chapter by a detailed discussion of the basic features of local administration 
together with the electoral system in local elections in Turkey.   With this chapter I will 
start to evaluate patterns in Turkish local elections. As mentioned, my evaluation will 
start with aggregate level data. First, comparative turnout levels in national and local 
elections are evaluated in order to see whether turnout rates in different level elections 
are in line with the expectations of the second order model. Later, I will look at three 
indicators that show the change in vote distribution between elections; namely 
fragmentation, volatility and Effective Number of Parties (ENP). In line with the 
expectations of the second order model national and local elections are expected to 
show different characteristics in these indicators.   
1. Voter Turnout in National and Local Elections  
The second order election model contends that turnout rates are lower in second 
order elections than in national elections since “less is at stake.”  Consequently it is 
expect that turnout in local elections will be lower. In fact, many studies on election 
turnout already confirm that turnout in local elections is uniformly lower than national 
elections all over the world (Morlan 1984). This is also the case in Turkey (Çitçi et.al. 
2001). However, a close examination of turnout rates and their comparison with 
national elections show that turnout differences between national and local elections are 
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increasingly narrowing, especially after 1980s. Moreover, in the 1990s and 2000s we 
witness elections where turnout for local elections exceeded national elections.  
 
As explained in detail above, local elections are held at four levels at the 
municipal level: Provincial council elections, municipal council elections, elections for 
mayor of municipality and metropolitan mayor. Here I will use provincial council and 
mayor of municipality election turnout rates in order to compare local elections with 
national elections. Provincial councils are the least powerful of the local administration 
bodies. However, in all local elections voters tend to show up more for these elections 
than mayor of municipality and municipal council elections. Probably due to this high 
turnout local elections for provincial council are argued to emulate national election 
results. Mayor of municipality elections are important because mayors are the most 
popular figures of local administration and it can be argued that elections for mayor are 
reflective of local and candidate specific effects on voting behavior more than other 
type of election (Çitçi et.al. 2001). 
 
In the table below turnout rates for national, provincial council and mayoral 
elections can be found. In total there are 12 national and 10 local elections. The national 
elections results since the first multi-party elections are included, yet local elections 
start from the 1963 elections. This is because it is impossible to find proper election 
results for local elections held in the 1950s. Two local elections were held in that 
period, in 1950 and 1955, but there are no national turnout or vote share data concerning 
these elections in the state archives. Only turnout rates for some big cities can be 
accessed. For this reason these two elections are not included in the analysis.  
 
When we look at national turnout rates the assumption of the second order model 
holds. The model expects higher turnout rate for national elections and average turnout 
rate for national elections is 81,05%, whereas it is 77,75% for the provincial council 
elections and 73,29% for mayor of municipality elections. Yet a close examination of 
turnout rates over time tells a different story.   
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Table 2: Voter Turnout in National and Local Elections   
Election Years National Election Provincial Council Mayor 
1950 89,3   
1954 88,6   
1957 76,6   
1961 81,4   
1963  77,6 69,3 
1965 71,3   
1968  65,7 59,4 
1969 64,3   
1973 66,8 61,7 56 
1977 72,4 60,4 53,1 
1983 92,3   
1984  91,0 85,6 
1987 93,3   
1989  81,5 78 
1991 83,9   
1994  92,2 90,5 
1995 85,2   
1999 87,1 86,9 85,2 
2002 79,1   
2004  75,28 71,7 
2007 84,2   
2009  85,3 84,1 
    
Average 81,05 77,75 73,29 
Source: Çulhaoğlu 2007 and www.ysk.gov.tr  
 35
Below are the average turnout rates for three types of elections by decade. On 
average, national election turnout seem to be higher than the other two types of local 
elections. However, in the 1990s the average turnout for local elections, both for 
provincial council and mayor, exceeded national elections. The highest turnout for local 
elections was observed in the 1994 local elections with 91% turnout in provincial 
council elections.  One observation about the comparison of turnout rates is the close 
proximity of turnout rates in national and local elections, especially provincial council 
averages. In the 1960s the provincial council election turnout average is only 1% lower 
than national elections. In the 1970s the gap widened to 8%, while in mayoral elections 
turnout plummeted down to nearly 50%.  In the 1980s turnout for national elections is 
more than local elections by at least 5%, but after the military coup of 1980 turnout 
increased nearly 20% on average for all elections. This increase continued for local 
elections in the 1990s and for the first time local election turnout rates surpassed the 
national election average. In the 2000s turnout rates for all elections showed a decline 
and trailed back to 80%.  Turnout for national elections remain higher than local 
elections on average, however, as in the 1960s the difference in the average is as small 
as 1%. 
Table 3: Average Turnout Rates in National and Local Elections  
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
National elections 84,8 72,3 69,6 92,8 85,4 81,65 
Provincial council  71,65 61,05 86,25 89,55 80,25 
Mayor  64,35 54,55 81,8 87,85 77,9 
 
Related to these points, one of the important lessons to be drawn from here is that 
turnout for all types of elections are shifting in sync. Turnout starts with a high average 
of 84,8 in the 1950s. In the 1960s it floats around 70% both for national and provincial 
council elections, trailed by mayoral elections. In the 1970s it declines to a level of 
60%, although turnout was a little bit higher for local elections.  In the 1980s turnout for 
all types of elections jumps up nearly 20%. In the 1990s, local elections turnout 
continues to rise, whereas the national elections turnout rate declined but still 
maintained a level of 85%. In the 2000s turnout rates for all elections fell to 80%. 
National election turnout rates are higher than local elections, however, the difference 
between national and provincial council elections is as small as 1,4%.  
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Figure 1: Turnout in National and Local Elections, 1961-2009 
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
19
50
19
54
19
58
19
62
19
66
19
70
19
74
19
78
19
82
19
86
19
90
19
94
19
98
20
02
20
06
Election Year
Tu
rn
ou
t National
Provincial Council
Mayor
 
 
Similar patterns of turnout in different kinds of elections shows that local 
elections are influenced by national political developments and the national state of 
affairs. When we look at the figure above the pattern is shown more clearly; turnout 
rates almost move in parallel.. This is in conjunction with the second order model in that 
local elections are under the influence of national politics. However, average turnout 
rates do not validate the turnout assumption of the second order model. Although 
turnout on average is higher for national elections the difference is only about 2,5%, and 
most of the time as little as 1% using decade averages.  
 
More importantly, we observe higher turnout rates for local elections compared to 
national elections in 1994 and 2009. In 1994 the turnout for provincial council elections 
was 92,2%, nearly 8% higher than the previous national elections of 1991. As indicated 
before, the decade average for the 1990s is higher for local elections than national 
elections. In the last local elections in 2009 the turnout rate again surpassed the previous 
national election of 2007 by about 1% for provincial council elections and mayor of 
municipality elections. These figures challenge the assumptions of many turnout studies 
in the literature as well as one of the main assumptions of the second order model. 
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The rise in voter turnout can be partially linked to compulsory voting adopted 
after the 1980 coup. In other democracies it is observed that compulsory voting 
increases the turnout rate. This is also observed in Turkey in the 1980s. In the 1989 
elections compulsory voting was not applied in local elections and as a result that 
election witnessed a significant decline in voter turnout when compared to other 
elections held in the 1980s (Kösecik 2005: 260). However local elections turnout 
continued to rise in the 1990s. Even for the mayor of municipality elections the 
difference in turnout rates between national elections and mayoral elections 
significantly declined over the years.  On average, turnout rates in national elections 
trailed that of mayoral elections in the 1990s. The discrepancy between turnout rates 
was once as high as 15% in the 1990s, but narrowed down to only 3% in the 2000s. 
Kösecik (2005: 259) shows that with the exception of a couple of countries like Italy 
and Luxembourg, where local turnout is traditionally higher than national elections, 
turnout rates in Turkey are already high in national elections and the discrepancy 
between national and local elections is smaller compared to European countries.       
 
In 1973, 1977 and 1999 national and local elections were carried out in the same 
year. In 1999 all elections were held on the same day. Another indicator of the rising 
importance of local elections can be found in a comparison of turnout rates for these 
elections. In 1973, local elections turnout trailed that of national elections by about 
10%. In the 1977 elections this gap widened and rose to nearly 20% for mayoral 
elections compared to national elections. In the 1999 elections, however, overall turnout 
was higher than 85% and nearly the same for national, provincial council and mayor of 
municipality elections.     
 
Looking at this analysis of turnout rates some conclusions can be reached. First, it 
is apparent that socio-political developments in the national arena affect both national 
and local elections in the same way and a clear pattern is observed in participation in all 
elections. Second, local elections are gaining importance in the eyes of the electorate 
and political actors compared to national elections. Turnout rates are very close to 
national elections and in some instances local turnout surpasses that of national 
elections. As indicated in the literature review this can be attributed to rapid 
urbanization (İncioğlu 2002), changing administrative systems, the creation of relatively 
powerful municipal bodies like metropolitan municipalities and the increasing prospect 
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of transfer for successful local politicians to the national arena. Last but not least, 
looking at these inferences it would not be wrong to conclude that the turnout 
assumption of the second order model is not fulfilled completely for Turkish local 
elections. Although local election campaigns are dominated by national debates it can 
be argued that local elections have their own unique characteristics and  cannot be 
evaluated as one-to-one reflections of national elections (Çarkoğlu 2009). This is 
evidenced by the increased turnout levels in local elections compared to elections at the 
national level.      
2. Fragmentation, Volatility and Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 
In this second part of the chapter I will compare national and local elections 
according to three different indicators. According to the assumptions of the second 
order model there is less tactical voting and voters feel freer to vote for small parties. 
This leads to a decrease in the vote share of big parties and increases the showing of 
small parties. That is why we would expect the number of parties to increase in second 
order elections. According to Powell (1982), party system attributes can be measured 
through party linkages to social groups; level of support for extremist parties; 
fragmentation and volatility of support (Çulhaoğlu 2007: 58) Among these measures 
volatility, fragmentation and effective number of parties (ENP) indices are useful tools 
to measure changes in the vote distribution in the political arena. I will calculate these 
indices both for national and local elections and their comparisons are expected to tell 
us whether the assumptions of the second order model holds for Turkish local elections 
or not.1 In this section I will first make an analysis of fragmentation and volatility in the 
Turkish elections and then make a comparison of fragmentation, volatility and effective 
number of parties indices for national and local elections in order to see whether they 
validate the assumptions of the second order model for local elections. 
                                                 
1 All indexes are calculated by the present author from official Turkish election data. For 
national election data since 1950 see Tuncer and Danacı (2003) and www.ysk.gov.tr. 
For local election results see Turan (2008) and www.ysk.gov.tr 
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According to Çarkoğlu (2002), the first defining characteristic of the Turkish 
party system is the high level of electoral volatility. Average volatility since the first 
competitive elections in 1950 is nearly 23 percent.  This means that nearly a quarter of 
voters changed their votes from one election to the other. Akgün (2001) reports from 
Mainwaring (1998) that this amount is 20.5% for Latin American countries, which are 
known for their high degree of volatility. As Turkish democracy is subject to 
interventions from outside (i.e. military interventions), high electoral volatility can be 
attributed to party closures and forced mergers as a result of these outsider 
interventions. Yet, especially in the elections after the 1990s voters shifted their 
preferences in large amounts from one party to another in order to punish parties for 
their performance.  Between the 1999 and 2002 elections, for example, nearly half of 
the electorate switched parties.  
 
There is a pattern in this shift of the electorate between parties from one election 
to another. The Turkish electorate is shifting from one party to another, but it is mainly 
shifting to the right no matter what the name of the party is.  Pro-Islamist and nationalist 
parties, which can be dubbed extreme right parties, gained 11% of the vote in 1987. 
Following a steady rise they increased their support to 17% in 1991, 30% in 1995, 35% 
in 1999 and 54% in 2002. AKP alone garnered 46,6% of the vote in 2007 elections. 
Although the volatility between parties seems apparent, there appears to be an 
established trend that in future elections voters are most likely to vote for rightist parties 
even if they change their party preference. When asked to place themselves in a left-
right continuum 22.5% defined themselves as moderately or extremely right in 1990. In 
2002 this figure nearly doubled to 42.9% with 24.1% defining themselves in the 
extreme right position. (Kalaycıoglu 1999, Çarkoğlu Ergüder and Kalaycıoğlu 2002)  
 
A second characteristic of the Turkish party system is the fragmentation of the 
electorate. Not only have the election results become more fragmented, especially after 
the 1980s, but parties are splitting into smaller groups despite this fragmented portrait. 
In the three elections held in the 1950s, the DP and CHP together garnered around 90% 
of the vote. (Başlevent et.al. 2004) However, after 1960 the system became more 
fragmented in nearly all elections. The effective number of parties increased from 1.4 
for the first competitive elections in 1950 to 4.8 in the 1999 elections. One of the 
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reasons for this fragmentation is the undemocratic character of party organizations. As 
party elites are very intolerant against intra-party opposition it facilitates fragmentation 
of parties in post election periods. It is surprising to see that the party system became 
more fragmented in the post-1980 period despite a 10% threshold, which had been 
deliberately initiated by the military regime after the 1980 coup in order to prevent this 
exact situation. According to Sayarı (2002: 17), military interventions proved to be the 
main force behind fragmentation since the 1960s. When we look at the figures, it is seen 
that fragmentation stepped up after the military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980.    
 
Regarding the constant increase of fragmentation in the system Çarkoğlu (2002: 
139) counts the following historical factors: 
 
i. Military interventions persistently altered the party system, closed 
many parties and prevented the development of long term voter 
attachment to the parties.  
ii. The institutional and legal structure of the party system gives no 
incentive to party elites to connect with people. Party elites are more 
concerned with distributing patronage than contacting people and 
making them part of the organization. 
iii. Party organizations do not depend on people in terms of resources. 
They derive their funds via patronage relations and from state funds 
rather than mobilizing people. 
iv. Party organizations lack ideological content and do not feel any 
incentive to mobilize people through civic involvement.  
v. Younger voters view elections from a more economic perspective.  
Since they lack ideological commitment to any party it is easier to shift 
their vote from one party that underperforms economically to another 
that is expected to do better. 
   
One should also mention that changes in the electoral system add to fragmentation 
in the system. In line with Duverger’s law (Duverger 1972) the plurality system 
employed between 1950 and 1960 led to a two-party system and various types of 
proportional representation (PR) employed after 1960 created a multi-party system. It is 
Powell’s (1982) assertion that PR electoral systems are more likely to lead to 
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fragmentation and that is what we observe in the Turkish polity. How the system 
resisted various measures like the 10% threshold and kept increasing fragmentation is 
an idiosyncrasy of Turkish politics. In addition to the factors mentioned above, 
Kalaycıoğlu (1997) mentions rapid mobilization, deepening cultural cleavages and the 
disruption of political socialization processes lead to increased fragmentation and 
volatility. Changes in constitutional and other legal designs, the end of the Cold War 
and deepening ethnic strife are cited by Kalaycıoğlu as factors contributing to the 
deepening cleavages and hence fragmentation of the electorate (cited in Başlevent et.al. 
2004: 310).     
 
Incidentally, I should mention that although fragmentation and volatility both 
appear to be high in Turkey, they should not necessarily be moving in the same 
direction. They sometimes part ways: For instance, fragmentation continues to increase 
while volatility decreases in the 1990s and this is not all unexpected. Volatility may go 
up because people choose to change votes from their previous parties to new ones, 
however as it happened in 2002, this may accompanied by a decrease in fragmentation. 
In 2002 volatility was high because people deserted governing parties en masse and 
dominantly voted for two major parties, AKP and CHP. Therefore, there occurred a 
slight decrease in fragmentation in 2002.2    
 
Now I would like to present my calculations of fragmentation, volatility and ENP 
indices for national and local elections.  
 
Fractionalization index (F)3 shows the current diversity of the electorate, meaning how 
many different parties gained meaningful results in the election.4 F varies between 0 and 
1. It reaches a minimum of zero when one party receives the entire popular vote. As the 
number of parties receiving relatively small electoral support increases the index will 
approach one.  
                                                 
2 For all calculated fractionalization and volatility index values see figures and tables 
below.   
3 Fractionalization is used interchangeably with the term “fragmentation” in the 
literature. Following the convention, these terms are used interchangeably in this text.  
4 The fractionalization index (F) is calculated by using election outcomes i=1,...N 
parties in the following formula: F ={1 - ΣN (Vote % )2}. See Rae (1967) 
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Volatility index shows the ratio of voters that changed their vote from last election 
to the current one.5  Volatility index varies between 0 and 1. If V=0 for an election year, 
this means in the election all parties garnered exactly the same votes they get in the 
previous election. If V=1, this points to a completely instable political system.  
   
Effective number of parties (ENP) is another measure of party system 
fragmentation also used comparing different political systems. It allows us to count the 
number of parties in a party system by weighting parties according to their strength. 
Vote share or seat share in the parliament can be used as weight. Here, I will use vote 
share in order to calculate effective number of parties.6 
 
Table 4: Volatility, Fragmentation and ENP for national elections, 1961-2007  
National elections Volatility ENP Fragmentation 
1961  3,39 0,7 
1965 24,5 2,71 0,63 
1969 11,4 3,33 0,7 
1973 24,85 4,31 0,76 
1977 13,35 3,12 0,68 
1983  2,85 0,65 
1987 35,65 4,11 0,75 
1991 17,25 4,67 0,78 
1995 21,5 6,16 0,83 
1999 19,3 6,79 0,85 
2002 50,9 5,43 0,81 
2007 14,45 3,48 0,71 
Averages 23,31 4,19 0,73 
 
                                                 
5 Volatility index (V) is calculated by using i=1,...N parties in the following formula: 
V={(1/2) ΣN (|Vote% i, t-Vote% i,t 1|)}. See Pedersen (1979) 
6 ENP calculated with the formula (ENP) = 1/(1-Fractionalization Index). See Laakso 
and Taagepera (1979), Taagepera and Shuggart (1989) on ENP 
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Table 5: Volatility, Fragmentation and ENP local elections, 1963-2009 
Local elections Volatility ENP Fragmentation 
1963  2,9 0,65 
1968 12,6 3,08 0,67 
1973 23,6 3,8 0,74 
1977 8,15 2,7 0,63 
1984  3,87 0,74 
1989 29,9 4,72 0,78 
1994 17,75 6,22 0,83 
1999 21,3 6,91 0,85 
2004 47,8 4,3 0,76 
2009 13,5 4,26 0,76 
Averages 21,82 4,27 0,74 
 
These indices tell us how fractured the electorate is from one election to another 
and within the time of the current election itself.  As indicated above, according to the 
expectations of the second order election model fragmentation should be higher in local 
elections because voters feel freer to leave bigger parties and vote for smaller parties in 
elections where less is at stake. Accordingly, ENP is expected to be higher in the second 
order elections. As more parties get votes the number of effective parties increases. 
According to the expectations of the second order model, volatility indices for different 
elections are not expected to have a clear pattern because as voters punish incumbents 
or signal grievance with policies in the local election, they are expected to turn back to 
their initial positions in the next first order election. Also, due to the freedom felt by the 
voters to change their vote in second order elections I would expect vote swings to be 
more pronounced in the second order elections.  
 
Before interpreting the trends in national and local elections I should reiterate that 
these indices are calculated with the election data after the 1961 elections because 
country wide local election results are not compiled for local elections until the 1963 
local elections.   
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Figure 2: Comparative Volatility Indices for National and Local Elections 
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Volatility in national elections is 23,31% on average whereas it is 21,82% in local 
elections for provincial council.  The volatility index itself shows volatility over 
elections. It hit a low point in the 1969 national elections with 11,4% and recorded its 
highest value in the 2002 national elections with 50,9%. This means that in 1969 only 
11,4% of the electorate change their vote from previous election to the current one, 
whereas in the 2002 elections nearly 51% of the electorate changed their votes 
compared to the previous elections in 1999. In local elections volatility is also high with 
an average of 21,82%. This means that in each provincial council election at least one 
fifth of the voters are changing their votes when compared to the previous local 
election. The lowest volatility is observed in the 1977 elections. Only 8,15% of the 
electorate changed votes. It is interesting to note that national elections held in the same 
year also witnessed one the lowest volatility figures at only 13,35%.  The highest 
volatility is observed in the 2004 elections with 47,8%. Note that the highest volatility 
for national elections is observed in the previous national elections of 2002. 
 
It is seen that volatility of national elections is higher than volatility of local 
elections. Here I calculated volatility for national elections by comparing each national 
election result with the previous national election and for local elections by comparing 
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results of each local provincial election with the previous local elections. This is also the 
way used in Freire (2004).  
 
However, a better comparison of national elections with the local elections can be 
made by putting all elections together and calculating volatility for each local election 
with compared to the previous national election. Similarly for each national election 
volatility is calculated in comparison to the previous local election. This way we can 
truly grasp the difference of vote choice between national and local elections.  
 
Below are the results for volatility index calculated with the dataset comprising all 
national and local elections after 1961. 
 
Figure 3: General Volatility Index 
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The results are telling. Here we can see that volatility in local elections are 
generally higher than volatility in national elections. Highest volatility rates are 
observed in 1984 local elections and in 2002 general elections with more than 40% of 
the voters changing their votes with respect to the previous elections. Higher rates of 
volatility for local elections with compared to previous national elections means that 
voters are more likely to spread their votes from one national election to the next local 
election. However, not all local elections show higher volatility, in some election years 
national elections are more volatile. 
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Notice that both local and national elections were held in the same year two times; 
in years 1973 and 1977. In 1999 both elections were held in the same day. Looking at 
volatility rates for these elections and comparing volatility for elections held in same 
years can be instructive. For 1793 elections both national and local volatility are higher 
than 20%, national elections showing 1% more volatility than local elections with 
24,75%. In 1977 local elections are more volatile than national elections, with 
comparing both to the 1973 national elections. In 1999 again national elections are 
showing more volatility than local elections held in the same day.       
 
It is expected according to the model that volatility in local elections will be 
higher. Yet the indices do not match up to this expectation. Volatility in national 
elections is higher on average. Out of three elections when national and local elections 
were held in the same year, only in 1977 was volatility for municipal council elections 
5% higher than the national elections volatility rate. Other than that national elections 
always showed higher volatility.  
When we look at general volatility index, local elections show higher volatility in 
some elections, but then again, in some other elections volatility in national elections 
surpass previous local election volatility. As already indicated, general volatility for the 
same year elections are similar. In 1977 local election volatility is higher, whereas in 
1973 and 1999 national elections are more volatile.  
 
More importantly, similar to the inferences from the turnout rate debate, separate 
volatility trends for national and local elections show nearly one to one correspondence. 
The highest and lowest volatility elections are the same for both types of elections and 
also it can be seen in the figure that fluctuations in volatility in the two types of 
elections are following each other. They go up and down at the same time. This is also 
the same for the general volatility. Although local elections are more volatile with 
respect to national elections in general, electoral volatility, either computed with the 
same type of elections or compared with other types, follow a similar movement pattern 
over years.   
 
This evidence can be used to invalidate assumptions of the second order model 
because according to the aggregate data Turkish voters are not behaving more free to 
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change their votes in local elections and turn back to their original parties in national 
elections. Rather, it seems that national trends in volatility, just as with turnout, are 
reflected in local elections behavior.  
 
Figure 4: Comparative Fragmentation Indices for National and Local Elections 
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When we look at Fragmentation a similar pattern is observed.  In national elections the 
average fragmentation is 0,73 compared to 0,74 in local elections. Fragmentation never 
drops lower than 0,6 in Turkish elections. Remember, this index shows how fractured 
the electorate is as it gets closer to 1. For the elections held after 1961 the lowest 
fragmentation is observed in the 1965 national elections with a ratio of 0,63 and highest 
fragmentation is in 1999 elections with 0,85. In the provincial council elections on the 
other hand, the lowest fragmentation ratio is observed in the 1977 elections with 0,63. 
Two elections held in the 1960s also reveal a low level of fragmentation at 0,65 and 
0,67.  The highest fragmentation is seen in the 1990s. In the 1994 local elections 
fragmentation is 0,83, only to rise up to its highest value in 1999 with 0,85.  For the 
elections of 1973, 1977 and 1999 in which both elections were held in the same year, 
fragmentation ratios are similar; in 1973 fragmentation of the electorate in both 
elections is about 0,75, then in the next elections of 1977 it falls down to 0,65 for both 
types of elections. In the 1999 elections fragmentation is the highest for both elections 
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at 0,85. It should be noted that the equal fragmentation value might be due to the fact 
that the elections were held on the same day in 1999. 
 
Figure 5: Comparative ENP Indices for National and Local Election  
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Expectedly, ENP moves along with fragmentation; ENP is 4,19 in legislative 
elections while it is 4,27 for local elections. ENP for both elections can be counted as 
the same. To repeat, we would expect the effective number of parties to be much higher 
in local elections than in the national elections. Again, the difference is not high but the 
expectation is that ENP would be higher in local elections as smaller parties purportedly 
have an advantage to collect more votes in the second order. ENP peaked in the 1990s 
reaching 6,91 in the provincial council elections and 6,79 in the national elections of 
1999, with a sharp decline in the 2000s. For the last elections, ENP in national elections 
is 3,48 whereas for local elections it is a little bit higher, 4,26.  
 
Looking at this data it is hard to find supporting evidence for the second order 
model. If the assumptions of the second order model were true, then we should have 
experienced a fractured electorate in the local elections and a more coherent one in the 
national elections. However, on average fragmentation is nearly the same for both 
elections. In addition, as shown in the figure and in accordance with the movements in 
turnout and volatility, fragmentation in both types of elections follow the same pattern 
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with only slight differences. This again shows that fragmentation in general is affected 
by national political debates. It can be argued that voters are not showing their 
discontent for the governing parties and not voting for smaller parties in the local 
elections.  However, depending on the timing of the local elections they are either 
signaling the direction of the vote change in the next national election or following  
previous national elections patterns.  
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CHAPTER IV:  INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS  
 
It has been repeatedly argued in this study that previous works on the local 
elections usually lack individual level analysis that investigates the factors affecting the 
voters in their local vote choice. Second order election model makes certain 
assumptions about individual level decision making in different level elections, yet 
again studies based on this model also miss the individual level analysis based on 
survey data, most of the time. In this chapter, following the analysis of aggregate vote 
distributions and turnout levels in different level elections,in Turkey, I will embark 
upon individual level analysis by constructing a regression model using data from a 
previously conducted voting intentions survey.  
1. Data and Methodology  
In this chapter I use data from the Survey of Electoral Intentions conducted by 
Veri Araştırma in December 2003-January 2004. This survey is a part of a series of 
surveys conducted in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004 with the same 
methodology by TÜSES and Veri Araştırma. These surveys have been used in many 
academic publications (Başlevent et. al. 2004, Tüses 2004, etc.). The survey data used 
in this dissertation is previously used in Başlevent et.al. (2009). The survey is conducted 
in 26 out of 81 provinces of Turkey with a nationally representative sample of 1806 
respondents. 689 of these respondents (38,2% of the sample) are defined as residents of 
rural areas, whereas 1117 of the respondents (61,8%) are residing in urban Turkey.  
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In the survey rural population is defined as people living in places with a 
population less than 20.000, and people living in areas with a population of more than 
20.000. However, municipalities are established in places with a population of more 
than 2.000. When we look at village-city distinction, in the sample 19,5% of the 
respondents are picked from the villages and 80,5% from the cities. Accordingly, first I 
have excluded respondents living in rural areas with a population of less than 2.000 
from the dataset because they can only vote for village headman but cannot vote for 
municipal offices in the local elections. Excluding 352 respondents living in the villages 
decreased the size of the sample to 1454.  
 
Later I have dropped respondents who responded undecided, did not vote or no 
answer for questions “Which party did you vote for in the last general elections of 
2002” and/or “Which party candidate would you vote for district and/or metropolitan 
mayorships in the upcoming local elections in March?” Voters who were not at the 
voting age at the time the last elections were hold are excluded as well since they are 
not in a position to provide answer to the “last vote” question. Also respondents who 
gave “Don’t know” answers to the relevant questions that will be operationalized as 
independent variables and included in the model are excluded from the sample (These 
relevant questions and transformations made in the variables are explained in detail 
below). After these, sample size shrank to 683 and all investigations are conducted with 
this sample.  
 
In the survey respondents are asked which party they voted in the last general 
elections, which party they would vote for if the general elections are held today and 
which party candidate they would vote for in the upcoming metropolitan and/or district 
municipal elections. The dependent variable will be the vote switch between the general 
and the local elections. I would like to investigate the factors that effect people in 
changing their votes from the general elections to the local elections. In order to do this 
I will use binary logistic regression.  
 
Logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is qualitative in nature 
(Kennedy 2008). Logistic function is bounded by 0 and 1; this quality makes it a better 
function to predict qualitative dependent variables that are expressed as dummy 
variables, than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), because OLS may predict values above 1 
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and below 0.  Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation in order to 
predict the change in the dependent variable. However, unlike OLS it does not predict 
the change in the dependent variable by regressing it on the independent variables. 
Logistic regression first transforms the dependent into logit variable and estimates 
probability of an event occurring or not in terms of odds ratios (Garson 2009). So the 
logistic coefficients reported in the regression output should be read as change in the 
logit caused by a unit change in the independent variable. Coefficients, shown as B 
coefficients in the SPSS output, can take any value between plus and minus infinity, 
positive values indicating an increase and negative values indicating a decrease in the 
logit of the dependent. 0 B coefficient means the independent variable does not affect 
the probability of the dependent. 
  
The odds ratio on the other hand, indicated as Exp (B) in the SPSS output, is the 
natural logarithm of the B coefficient. So when B equals 0, odds ratio is equal to 1 and 
it means the independent variable does not affect the dependent variable. If the odds 
ratio is less than 1 it means the independent variable decreases the logit, hence the odds 
of the event and if the odds ratio is bigger than 1, it means that the independent variable 
increases the odds. I will present both logistic coefficients and odds ratios for the 
regressions and use odds ratios in order to interpret the results.  
 
One point not to be missed in interpreting the logistic regression output is the type 
of data for independent variables. In binary logistic regression, SPSS takes the lower 
category as reference and predicts the higher category by default. Here, according to my 
dependent variable changing votes between elections (1) is predicted and voting for the 
same party in both elections (0) is taken as the reference category. Interpretation of 
independent variables, however, depends on the type of the data. If the independent is 
continuous, odds ratio is the factor by which the odds change for the dependent variable 
after one unit change in the independent variable. It can simply be read as the percent 
increase in the odds of the event. If the independent variable is categorical, highest 
category is taken as the reference and odds ratios are calculated for all other categories 
of the categorical independent variable according to the reference category. If the 
independent variable is dichotomous, meaning it only has two categories (usually 0 and 
1) the lower category is taken as the reference and the odds ratio reported is calculated 
for the higher category.     
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As I am interested in vote change between general and local elections dependent 
variable is defined as 0 if the respondent voted or inclined to vote for the same party in 
both general and local elections and 1 if the respondent indicated different party choices 
for different elections. Changes in the independent variables operationalized below are 
expected to account for changes in the probability of people voting for the same party in 
both general and local elections compared to changing their votes.                         
2. Model Specification 
As indicated, dependent variable is set as the vote switch between general and 
local elections. In the survey the respondents are asked for their vote choice in the last 
general elections together with their hypothetical party and party candidate choices for 
general and municipal elections if the elections were held today. Initially I planned to 
construct two models; in the first model the dependent would be the vote switch 
between actual vote in the last elections and the vote for local elections if the elections 
were held today. The second model, on the other hand, would take vote switch between 
two “if the elections were held today” questions, both for general and local elections.  
 
However, due to the limitations of survey methodology I had to drop the second 
model. After excluding no answer/don’t know responses sample size for respondents 
indicating a vote behavior for both elections if the elections were held today drops down 
to 810. In this sample only 13,7% of the respondents indicated a different vote choice, 
the rest 86,3% named the same party as their vote choice in the hypothetical general and 
local elections. Unfortunately, this does not allow enough variability to run statistically 
significant tests with the data.  
 
Given the lessons drawn from previous survey methodology literature, this is not 
unexpected. Since the survey is not held before an election period, where respondents 
are expected to develop ideas about their vote choice, when respondents are asked to 
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indicate a party choice they are temped to respond the same way, irrespective of the 
type of election (Çarkoğlu 2009).  
 
For this reason I constructed the dependent variable according to the answers 
given to the questions “Which party did you vote for in the last general elections of 
2002?” and “Which party candidate would you vote for district and/or metropolitan 
mayorship in the upcoming local elections in March?”. Voters in the sample who 
switched their votes coded as 1 and who voted for the same party, irrespective of the 
party choice, coded as 0. In metropolitan areas respondents are asked for the prospective 
vote choice both for the metropolitan (büyükşehir) and district (ilçe) municipalities, 
whereas in places without a metropolitan municipality, they are only asked for their 
vote choice in district municipality elections. I took metropolitan municipality vote 
choice if the respondent is living in a metropolitan area and merged it with district 
municipality vote choice of the respondents who are living outside metropolitan areas 
and later used it to code the dependent variable. This dependent variable s named 
vote_switch.   
 
In the sample 26,6% of the respondents indicated that they changed their vote 
choices from general election to local elections, whereas 73,4% of the respondents same 
party choice for both elections. 
 
Table 6: Vote Switch 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 501 73,4 73,4 73,4 
1 182 26,6 26,6 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
Explanatory variables are consisting from economic and non-economic factors. 
Non-economic variables include, first of all, standard demographic variables; age, 
gender, education, religiosity, residence in metropolitan areas (metropolitan).  
 
Age is entered as a control variable in order to see whether ageing leads to a 
difference in voting in general and local elections. age is entered as a continuous 
variable in the model. In the table below grouped age characteristics of the sample can 
be found. Age groups are as follows: Group 1: Age 18-20; Group 2: Age 21-24; Group 
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3: Age 25-39; Group 4: Age 40-54; Group 5: Age 55 +.  Largest group of the sample, 
with 41,4%, is the third group, aged between 25 and 39.    
  
Table 7: Age Group 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 22 3,2 3,2 3,2 
2 67 9,8 9,8 13,0 
3 287 42,0 42,0 55,1 
4 184 26,9 26,9 82,0 
5 123 18,0 18,0 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0  
 
 
In the survey females are coded as 1 and males as 2. I recoded the gender variable 
and give males 0, while leaving females as 1. As seen in the table 53,4% of the 
respondents are male and 46,6 percent are females.  
 
Table 8: Gender 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 365 53,4 53,4 53,4 
1 318 46,6 46,6 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0  
 
Education variable has four categories; 1- primary school or less; 2- secondary 
school graduate; 3- high school graduate; 4- higher education. I leave these categories 
as they are. In the model education is marked as a categorical variable. SPSS treats 
categorical independents variables as dummy and calculates coefficients and odds ratios 
according to taking highest category as a reference. In this case higher education is 
taken as the reference category in the model. In the sample 66,5% of the respondents 
have finished primary school or less; 10,7% have finished secondary school; 17,0% of 
the respondents have high school diploma and only 5,9%  have higher education. 
 
Table 9: Educational Attainment 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 454 66,5 66,5 66,5 
2 73 10,7 10,7 77,2 
3 116 17,0 17,0 94,1 
4 40 5,9 5,9 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0  
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In many studies on electoral behavior in Turkey religion is found to be a 
significant factor (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000, Kalaycıoğlu 1999). In the survey 
respondents are asked to state their degree of religiosity in a five scale category, 1 
indicating “very religious” and 5 being “not having any religious faith”. First I reversed 
these categories and recoded them as 1 being “not having any religious faith” and 5 
being “very religious” in order to use this as a continuous variable. 51,5% of the 
respondents say they are religious, whereas 15,6% indicate that they are very religious. 
  
Table 10: Religiosity 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 8 1,2 1,2 1,2 
2 12 1,8 1,8 2,9 
3 189 27,7 27,7 30,6 
4 360 52,7 52,7 83,3 
5 114 16,7 16,7 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
I also coded religiosity as a dummy variable. In religiosity dummy categories 4 
and 5, respondents who indicated they are religious or very religious, are coded as 1 and 
the other three categories as 0. 
 
Table 11: Religiosity Dummy (reldum)     
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 209 30,6 30,6 30,6 
1 474 69,4 69,4 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
 67,1% of the respondents in the sample defined themselves as religious or very 
religious. 
 
Another important variable will be place of residence. Other than the urban-rural 
and village-city distinction respondents are classified according to living in a 
metropolitan municipality or in a district municipality. I would like to see whether 
living in metropolitan municipalities, that are the most developed and populous areas of 
Turkey, has any effect on local vote choice. I have coded metropolitan variable as a 
dummy variable, for respondents who can vote for a metropolitan municipality coded as 
1 and the ones in the districts as 0. 
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Table 12: Metropolitan Residence 
          
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 291 42,6 42,6 42,6 
1 392 57,4 57,4 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
In the sample 57,4% of the respondents are residents of metropolitan 
municipalities, while 42,6% of the respondents are living in districts.  
 
Left-right placement of the respondents is also another standard variable included 
in the voting behavior models and I have included it here with the variable name 
left_right. In the survey respondents are asked to place themselves in a left right 
continuum in a 10 point scale with 1 being extreme left and 10 being extreme right.   
 
Figure 6: Left-Right Placement of Respondents 
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As seen from the chart most of the respondents define themselves either in the 
center or to the right of the center. While 23,7% of the respondents define themselves at 
the center, 15,5% of them are in the immediate right of the center (responding 6 in the 
scale). In total 59,2% of the respondents define themselves in the right, with 12,2% in 
the extreme right. On the other hand, only 17,1% of the sample define themselves in the 
left. Only 4% of the respondents place themselves in the extreme left. This is also 
consistent with the party vote choices of the respondents, a conspicuous majority of the 
respondents expressed intention to vote for right or far right parties. 
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“Say, a very well respected person in this area whom you have trusted declared 
his candidacy for mayorship from a party which you don’t think of voting before or a 
party that you don’t like. Would you vote for the aforementioned person anyways?”  
 
Answers to this question in the survey can be very valuable for understanding 
changes in voting behavior between different elections. If a respondent indicates that he 
will not vote for a party he dislikes even if he thinks the candidate is a respectful one, 
than we might expect that he is less likely to switch votes, because candidate is not an 
effective factor on respondent’s voting behavior. In the survey answers to this question 
are categorized as 1 = yes, 2 = no, 3 = it depends. I turned this into vote_candidate 
variable by recoding “no” answers as -1, “yes” answers as +1 and “it depends” answers 
as 0. 50,7% of the respondents indicated that they will not vote for a disliked party even 
if they like the candidate whereas 31,2% said they can vote for the candidate even if he 
is from a party they will not vote for normally. 
 
Table 13: Vote Intention for the Candidate 
     Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
-1 346 50,7 50,7 50,7 
0 124 18,2 18,2 68,8 
1 213 31,2 31,2 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
Party identification is regarded to be a critical variable that determines party 
choice in the previous voting studies (Kalaycıoğlu 2008). In the survey the respondents 
are asked for their party identification with the question “As of today, which party you 
do you feel close to your heart, and like its views?” I have recoded major parties AKP, 
DYP, CHP, MHP, DEHAP, GP and merged other parties as a single category under the 
name others. I coded party identification as a dummy variable with AKP as the 
reference category. This dummy variable has six categories: chpdum, dypdum, 
mhpdum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum    
 
Kalaycıoğlu (2008) reports that 67,1% of the respondents in his study expressed 
identification with a party and this is already too high for a country like Turkey where 
political arena is experiencing constant fluctuations and parties are new. As I have only 
included voters who voted in the last elections and the ones who expressed party choice 
 59
for the local elections, party identifiers are as high as 93%. Only 3,4% of the sample 
expressed no party identification and 3,7% did not answer the question. In the sample 
59,5% of the respondents indicate that they identify with AKP; 14,6% with CHP; 4% 
with MHP; 3,8% with GP; 3,5% with DYP and 2,8% with DEHAP.  
 
Table 14: Party Identification 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
AKP 406 59,4 59,4 
   ANAP 6 0,9 0,9 
DYP 24 3,5 3,5 
CHP 100 14,6 14,6 
BBP 4 0,6 0,6 
ÖDP 6 0,9 0,9 
SP 4 0,6 0,6 
DSP 4 0,6 0,6 
MHP 27 4,0 4,0 
BTP 1 0,1 0,1 
DEHAP 18 2,6 2,6 
TKP 2 0,3 0,3 
IP 2 0,3 0,3 
YTP 3 0,4 0,4 
GP 26 3,8 3,8 
SHP 1 0,1 0,1 
EMEP 1 0,1 0,1 
None 23 3,4 3,4 
No answer 25 3,7 3,7 
Total 683 100,0 100,0 
 
Ethnic and religious identity can also be a factor in determining vote choice and in 
order to see whether these are effective factors in changing the probability of voting for 
the same party in different elections I included two identity variables in the model, 
Alevi and Kurd identities, as dummy variables. In the survey respondents are asked 
define them with the question “Which one(s) of the following would you use if 
someone asked you to identify yourself?” and they are presented with 20 ethnic or 
religious identity categories, like Turk, Kurd, Alevi, Sunni, Zaza, Armenian, etc. 
Respondents are allowed to pick more than one of these categories, so a respondent 
could choose to be a Sunni-Turk, Sunni-Kurt or any other combinations s/he chooses to 
be.  
 
In Turkey, Alevis constitute the second biggest Islamic sect after Sunni Muslims. 
Although the exact number is not known, population of Alevis is estimated from 10 to 
20% of the total population in Turkey (Çarkoğlu and Toprak 2000, Güneş Ayata and 
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Ayata 2002). Alevis are most likely to vote for center-left parties (Başlevent et. al. 
2004, 2009). Respondents who picked Alevi category as at least one of the identity 
categories that define them are coded as 1 and the rest are coded as 0. In the sample 
6,6% of the respondents define themselves as Alevi.    
 
Table 15: Alevi Identity 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 638 93,4 93,4 93,4 
1 45 6,6 6,6 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
Kurds on the other hand constitute the biggest ethnic group after Turks in Turkey. 
Again, there are no exact numbers, but the amount of people of Kurdish origin is 
assumed to constitute 12 to 20% of the population. Ethnically aware Kurds are 
supposed to vote for DEHAP According to Güneş Ayata and Ayata (2002) between 
one-third and one-quarter of Kurds vote for DEHAP. However, DEHAP never managed 
to get 10% vote share to surpass the national threshold in general elections (Başlevent 
et. al. 2004, 2009). As like Alevis I coded respondents who picked Kurd as an identifier 
as 1 and the ones who do not as 0. In the sample 8,6% of the respondents chose Kurd 
identity as at least one of the identifying categories for themselves. 
 
Table 16: Kurd identity 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 624 91,4 91,4 91,4 
1 59 8,6 8,6 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
Economic factors also have important effects on voting behavior (Akarca and 
Tansel 2006, Başlevent et. al. 2009, 2004, Çarkoğlu 1997). In the survey, respondents 
are asked various questions about economy like “Do you think economic conditions in 
Turkey had gone better or worse in the last 12 months?” “Do you think economic 
conditions in Turkey will go better or worse in the next 12 months?” “Had your 
family’s economic conditions gone better or worse in the last 12 months?” “Do you 
think your family’s economic condition will go better or worse in the next 12 months?”  
 
The questions are asked on a 5-point scale with 1 indicating that economic 
condition of the country or respondent’s family gone much better, 2 indicating the 
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conditions gone better, 3 indicating the conditions are the same, 4 indicating the 
conditions had gone worse and 5 indicating that conditions had gone much worse. I 
recoded the categories in reverse 1 being much worse to 5 being much better.  
 
Table 17:  Personal Economic Views 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
1 17 2,5 2,5 2,5 
2 159 23,3 23,3 25,8 
3 278 40,7 40,7 66,5 
4 216 31,6 31,6 98,1 
5 13 1,9 1,9 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
I will use respondent’s view of his family’s economic conditions in the last 12 
months as an independent variable in the model, named econ_pers. Here I am using past 
economic evaluations as the basis of voting behavior.  40,7% of the respondents in the 
sample replied their family’s economic conditions are the same, 31,6% responded their 
conditions had gone better while 23,3% responded their family’s conditions had gone 
worse.  
 
In voting studies good economic performance is expected to increase support for 
the incumbent government, whereas bad performance is expected to lead to vote loss 
(Akarca and Tansel 2006, Başlevent et.al. 2009). Above mentioned questions are useful 
in showing voters’ view of economic conditions however they cannot be directly used 
in the model since they lack responsibility attribution. Here a respondent may indicate 
that his family’s economic condition had gone better in the last 12 months but this does 
not necessarily mean that the improvement is due to the good performance of the 
government and vice versa.    
 
Another question in the survey can be used in order to provide responsibility 
attribution “Is the government responsible with your family’s economic conditions had 
gone better or worse in the last 12 months?” The answers to this question are 1 = yes, 2 
= no and 3 = don’t know. I have excluded respondents with “don’t know” answer from 
the sample as missing and recoded the variable as a dummy, econ_govt, with 1 being 
yes and 0 being no. 
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Table 18:  Government’s Responsibility in Economic Conditions  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 173 25,3 25,3 25,3 
1 510 74,7 74,7 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
25,3% of the respondents do not hold the government responsible for their 
family’s economic conditions whereas 74,7% thinks the government is responsible with 
their household’s economic condition.  
 
Later I created the interaction variable econ_int by multiplying variables 
respondent’s view of family’s economic conditions (econ_pers) and government 
responsibility with the economic conditions (econ_govt). This interaction variable is 
expected to pick up effects of economic conditions on voting behavior.  
 
Table 19: Econ_int 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 173 25,3 25,3 25,3 
1 15 2,2 2,2 27,5 
2 126 18,4 18,4 46,0 
3 186 27,2 27,2 73,2 
4 173 25,3 25,3 98,5 
5 10 1,5 1,5 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
Another interaction variable is created for the category of people who thinks that 
their economic conditions had gone worse in the last 12 months. First, I created a 
dummy variable econbad; who thinks that the conditions had gone worse. Categories 1 
and 2 are coded 1, and the ones who think their conditions are the same or had gone 
better are coded 0. 25,8% of the respondents think economic condition of their 
households had gone worse, the rest 74,2% either thinks their economic conditions 
stayed the same or improved in the last 12 months.   
 
Table 20: Dummy for Bad Economic Views 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 507 74,2 74,2 74,2 
1 176 25,8 25,8 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
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Later I created the interaction variable (econbad_int) by multiplying this dummy 
with the variable econ_govt. This variable is created as an alternative to the variable 
econ_int and expected to pick up the difference in voting behavior between respondents 
who think that their economic conditions worsened because of government’s economic 
policies and the ones that does not.    
 
Table 21: Econbad_int 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
0 542 79,4 79,4 79,4 
1 141 20,6 20,6 100,0 
Total 683 100,0 100,0   
 
In the sample 20,6% of the respondents indicate that their household economic 
conditions had gone worse in the last year and they attribute responsibility for this 
situation to the government. Remaining 79,4% either do not think that their economic 
conditions worsened or they do not keep the government responsible for their economic 
conditions.  
3. Regression Models 
I will develop a series of regression models. The dependent variable will be the 
same for all of them: vote switch between general and local elections. In order to predict 
the probability of vote change in different elections I will use above operationalized 
economic and non-economic independent variables. In the base model the dependent 
variable would be vote_switch. Independent variables would be standard demographic 
variables: gender, age, education (entered as a categorical variable) metropolitan 
(dummy variable for metropolitan municipality residence), religiosity, left_right, 
vote_candidate (categorical variable created from the question “would you vote for a 
well respected candidate from a disliked party”), chpdum, dypdum, mhpdum, 
dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum (all party dummy variables for party identification), 
alevi (dummy variable for Alevi identity), kurt (dummy variable for Kurd identity), 
econ_pers (evaluation of respondents’ household economic conditions), econ_govt 
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(dummy variable for government’s responsibility in economic conditions), econ_int 
(interaction variable created by multiplication of econ_pers and econ_govt) 
4. Hypotheses about Independent Variables 
age, gender, metropolitan and education are entered as control variables. Their 
effects, if any, are to be seen. Looking at the high ratio of AKP voters in the data set, 
and given that metropolitan municipalities are dominated by AKP, I would expect living 
in a metropolitan area to decrease the odds of vote switch between elections. About 
education; many studies showed that AKP voters are predominantly from low-education 
categories (Başlevent et.al. 2009). Especially for lower education categories I would 
expect the effect to be negative for vote switch, if the variable turns out to be 
significant.  
 
Many studies reported that left-right distinction is meaningful in the Turkish 
context (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007, Çarkoğlu 1998, Esmer 2002). In this sample 
nearly 60% of the sample defined itself in the right of the left-right continuum. I would 
expect moving to the right would effect the vote switch negatively; that is rightists 
would be more likely to keep their votes same in the local elections given the similar 
amount of AKP voters in the sample, so left_right would decrease the odds of vote 
switch. 
 
religiosity variable is expected to be significant and high degrees of religiosity are 
also expected to decrease odds of vote switch, because AKP voters are also known for 
their high degree of religiosity.  
 
vote_candidate variable is expected to turn significant. As indicated before SPSS 
takes highest category as reference for categorical variables. Here respondents who said 
that they can vote for the candidate irrespective of his party are taken as reference and I 
would expect that responding “no” or it “depends” to the same question would decrease 
the odds of vote switch. 
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It would not be wrong to expect that a party identifier is more likely to stick to his 
vote in different elections. Here I expect especially AKP and CHP identifier dummies, 
akpdum and chpdum to be significant (AKP identifiers are about 60% and CHP 
identifiers are about 15% of the sample) and both of them are expected to decrease odds 
of vote switch in different elections. GP is an exceptional case here. Because of the 
idiosyncratic character of the party and the leader dominance it would not be surprising 
if being a GP identifier, gencdum variable, increases the odds of the vote switch.  
 
Identity variables alevi and kurt are also supposed to decrease odds of a vote 
switch in the elections if they turn to be significant variables.  
 
Economic variables are found to be working in favor of the government when 
economy going well and against it when it is going bad. (Çarkoğlu 2008) The 
interaction variable econ_int in the model picks up the respondents who think their 
economic conditions changed because of the government. I expect this variable to 
decrease odds of switching votes given the high rate of AKP voters in the sample and 
given the fact that the economy was taking off at the time of the survey. Government’s 
responsibility in economic conditions, econ_govt, by itself is expected to decrease the 
odds as well, if it turns out to be significant. 
 
Other coded economic variables, econbad and econbad_int are expected to 
increase odds of vote switch since they pick up the effects of bad economic conditions 
attributed to government.         
5. First Regression Model 
The output of the first regression is as follows. If I am to interpret these results, I 
will start with the significance tests for the model. There are two joint significance tests 
for the model in the binary logistic regression. “Omnibus tests of model coefficients” 
table shown in below is reported by default by the SPSS. This method tests whether the 
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predictors are capable of jointly predicting the dependent variable with applying a chi-
square test. According to the significance value and the significance level we conclude 
if at least one of the predictors is significantly related with the dependent variable.  
 
Here the significance is 0,00 for the model that means I can conclude the 
independent variables are jointly significant in predicting the dependent at all 
significance levels. 
 
Table 22: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for the First Regression 
 Chi-square Df Sig. 
Step 79,970 21 0,000 
Block 79,970 21 0,000 
Model 79,970 21 0,000 
 
 
 
Table 23: Model Summary for the First Regression 
  -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Step 1 711,925(a) 0,110 0,161 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. 
 
Another test for joint significance is Hosmer and Lemeshow test. This test also 
uses chi-square distribution and tests whether there is a difference between observed 
and predicted values. If the goodness of fit significance level is more than 0,05 then we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis, which is “there is no difference between observed and 
predicted values.” In this model significance value is 0,481 which is way higher above 
0,1 and 0,5 significance levels indicating that there is no difference between observed 
and predicted values and the model fits the data. 
 
Table 24: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for the First Regression 
  Chi-square Df Sig. 
Step 1 7,522 8 0,481 
 
Classification table tally how much of the predicted values are correctly predicted 
according to the actual observed values. Classification table, however, does not use the 
actual values but uses an arbitrary cut off point, mostly 0,50, in order to classify correct 
and incorrect predictions. For instance, if the a success, that is 1, is predicted between 
0,5 and 1 then it is assumed to be predicted correctly. Likewise, if a failure, that is 0, is 
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predicted between 0 and 0,5 then it is assumed to be predicted correctly. If the model 
predicts all values correctly then the percentage is 100%. It is better for the model to 
have a highest prediction percentage as possible.  
 
Here you can see the classification table for the base regression model. According 
to the model 74,7% of the predictions are correct. It can be observed that the model is 
more prone to predict 0’s more correctly. 94,2% of the failure cases are predicted 
correctly, whereas only 20,9% of successes are predicted correctly. Overall it can be 
argued that a correct prediction rate of 75% is pretty good for the model. 
 
Table 25: Classification Table for the First Regression 
Predicted 
vote_switch  Observed 
0 1 
Percentage Correct
0 472 29 94,2 vote_switch 
1 144 38 20,9 Step 1 
Overall Percentage     74,7 
a. The cut value is ,500 
 
According to the indicators above model fit is pretty high. The overall model is 
significant and the model fits the data. Now, I can continue with the interpretation of 
independent variables in the equation. SPSS reports binary logistic regression 
coefficients and odds ratios in the “Variables in the equation” table. Relevant output for 
my base regression model can be seen below. “Variables in the equation” table reports 
logistic coefficients (B), standard errors (S.E), Wald test statistics (Wald), degrees of 
freedom (d.f), significance (Sig.) and odds ratios (Exp (B)) for each independent 
variable in the model and the coefficient.  
 
As indicated before, logistic coefficients are estimators of the change in the logit 
(log odds of the event occurring) caused by a unit change in the independent variables. 
In the interpretation of the test results, however, it is easier to use odds ratios, Exp (B). 
Odds ratios are calculated by taking the natural logarithm of logistic coefficients and 
they indicate the factor by which odds of an event changes according to unit change in 
the independent variable.  
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Table 26: Variables in Equation for the First Regression 
 B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
dummy for metropolitan residence 
(metropolitan) -0,374 0,191 0,050 0,688
gender -0,115 0,195 0,555 0,891
age -0,015 0,008 0,054 0,985
education     0,430   
education(1) 0,037 0,415 0,929 1,038
education(2) 0,425 0,472 0,368 1,530
education(3) -0,140 0,452 0,756 0,869
respondents' view of their household's 
economic conditions (econ_pers) -0,290 0,234 0,215 0,748
dummy for respondents' view of 
government's responsibility for economic 
conditions (econ_govt) 
-1,212 0,854 0,156 0,298
interaction variable for economic variables 
econ_pers*econ_govt (econ_int) 0,245 0,272 0,368 1,277
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered yes (vote_candidate)     0,000   
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered no 
(vote_candidate(1)) 
-0,547 0,202 0,007 0,579
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered it depends 
(vote_candidate(2)) 
-1,270 0,310 0,000 0,281
respondent's left right placement 
(left_right) -0,112 0,050 0,026 0,894
religiosity 0,050 0,137 0,713 1,052
dummy for dyp identifiers (dypdum) 1,201 0,456 0,008 3,323
dummy for chp identifiers (chpdum) -0,320 0,347 0,357 0,726
dummy for mhp identifiers (mhpdum) 0,616 0,465 0,186 1,851
dummy for dehap identifiers (dehapdum) 
-0,208 0,739 0,778 0,812
dummy for genc party identifiers 
(gencdum) 1,696 0,455 0,000 5,454
dummy for other parties identifiers 
(otherdum) 0,703 0,287 0,014 2,020
dummy for alevi identity (alevi) -0,276 0,451 0,541 0,759
dummy for kurt identity (kurt) -0,619 0,403 0,124 0,538
Constant 1,806 1,051 0,086 6,085
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: metropolitan, gender, age, education, econ_pers, econ_govt, econ_int, 
vote_candidate, left_right, religiosity, dypdum, chpdum, mhpdum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum, alevi, kurt. 
 
In the model vote_candidate, dypdum and gencdum are significant at 1%; 
metropolitan, left_right and otherdum are significant at 5%; age is slightly insignificant 
at 5% and significant at 10%; gender, education, econ_pers, econ_govt, econ_int, 
religiosity, chpdum, dehapdum, mhpdum, alevi and kurt are insignificant at all levels.  
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Note that education and vote_candidate are entered as categorical variables into 
the model because they have more than two categories. SPSS treats them as dummies 
with more than two categories and makes predictions by taking the highest category as 
the reference. For education highest category higher education = 4 is taken as the 
reference; for vote_candiate variable voters who said that they would vote for a well 
respected candidate from a disliked party are the reference since this answer is coded as 
1, whereas “no” and “it depends” answers are coded as -1 and 0 respectively.  
 
Starting with significant variables; Odds ratio for metropolitan is 0,688. 
According to this regression respondents living in a metropolitan municipality is 0,688 
times less likely to vote for different parties in general and municipal elections.  
 
left_right is also a significant variable with an odds ratio of 0,894. According to 
the model a respondent who is one point on the right in the left-right continuum is 
expected to be 0,894 times less probable to vote for different parties in both elections. 
This means that as people move to right in the continuum they are more likely to stick 
to their party preferences. 
 
vote_candidate is also significant at 1%. This variable is entered as categorical 
variable and coefficients are calculated by taking answer category yes, coded 1, as 
reference. I would expect probabilities of other categories with respect to the reference 
category to be higher. If a voter is indicating that candidate himself is more important 
than the party then he might be expected to change his party choice more likely than the 
others and this would decrease his probability to vote for same party in different 
elections. All three categories for the variable are significant at 1% level, with 
significance values of 0,00 for the highest category, 0,07 for the second and 0,00 for the 
third. Odds ratios tells us that it is 0,579 times less probable for a respondent who said 
that he will not vote for a well-respected candidate if he is a candidate from a disliked 
party to change parties in elections rather than keeping his vote with compared to the 
one who said that he will vote for the candidate.  
 
Odds ratio for the category 0 is 0,281. This means that odds of voting for the same 
party compared to voting for different parties is decreased by a factor of 0,281 if the 
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respondent answers “it depends”, or 0, to voting for the candidate question compared to 
the respondent answering “yes”, or 1, to the same question.   
 
Along party identification dummies three variables are significant: dypdum is 
significant at 1% with an odds ratio of 3,323. This means that a DYP identifier is 3,323 
times more likely to change his vote in different elections with compared to an AKP 
identifier because AKP is taken as the reference category for this dummy variable. 
otherdum is significant at 5%. Odds ratio says that an identifier of small parties is 2 
times more likely to change votes in elections. This is expected when we think of 
traditional success of AKP cadres in local government starting with the party leader 
Tayyip Erdoğan. If a voter is already voting for AKP in the general election, and we can 
assume that an AKP identifier is, he would not have much reason to chance his vote for 
the municipal election, at least in terms of local government performance, because AKP 
municipalities are known for their success in local government. This is expectedly more 
pronounced in metropolitan municipalities where AKP captured most of the 
metropolitan cities at the time of the survey with the exception of İzmir Metropolitan 
Municipality. Small parties and right wing parties like DYP are expectedly lose votes in 
municipality elections, more likely to AKP. 
 
Also gencdum is significant at 1% with an odds ratio of 5,454. It means that Genc 
Party identifiers are more likely to change votes in different elections, up to 5 times 
with compared to AKP identifiers. They are more likely to change votes than DYP 
identifiers too. Odds ratio more than 1 means that the variable increases the probability 
of the event occurring. In this case it means that being a Genç Party identifier increases 
the probability of switching votes in general and local elections compared to keeping 
vote choice the same in different elections by a factor of 5,454.  
 
Genç Party is an idiosyncratic phenomenon in the Turkish politics. Entering the 
political arena just before the 2002 general elections Genç Party rallied people around a 
populist-nationalistic rhetoric within an incredibly small amount o time. Party leader 
was Cem Uzan, a business tycoon and media owner, and he hold an unprecedented 
political campaign. Party propaganda was hold mainly in the media through television 
and newspaper ads. Uzan was the only public of the party; he held rallies around the 
country where he had short but tailor-designed speeches by his publicists followed by 
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concerts of famous singers and distribution of free food for the followers of the event. 
The party, other than Uzan himself, was barely functional at the organizational level 
(Balcı 2003).  
Chpdum, mhpdum and dehapdum are insignificant party identification variables. 
Even though they are insignificant, looking at odds ratios of the se variables we can say 
that the direction of the relationship is estimated correctly by the model. Odds ratios for 
chpdum and dehapdum are less than 1, 0,726 and 0,812 respectively. This means that 
CHP and DEHAP identifiers are less likely to change their votes with compared to an 
AKP identifier. This is also not unexpected given the polarized political environment in 
Turkey since AKP’s ascendance to the government in 2002. Since 2002 elections issues 
around secularism became hot discussion topics again. The government party’s islamist 
background brought questions about its attachment to secular principles of the Turkish 
Republic and most actions of the government increasingly started to be evaluated not in 
their own right but their relation to secular principles. In this polarized environment 
CHP became the flag carrier of the secular camp. We can argue that a CHP identifier in 
this environment is expected to hold on to his party choice because voting has become a 
way of identity statement rather than a conscious choice between different political 
alternatives and voting for the best alternative. That is why for a CHP identifier it would 
not be surprising that he would stick to his party choice in different elections more than 
other party identifiers. 
 
 On the other hand after 2002 elections AKP appeared as a credible alternative to 
the traditionally Kurdish nationalist party DEHAP in the Kurdish dominated south-
eastern provinces. It is likely that DEHAP identifiers sticking to their positions in the 
face of an AKP contention in the elections. If these variables were to be significant, this 
direction of relationships between dummy categories and the reference category would 
not be surprising.    
 
This commercial-like political campaign somewhat showed success and although 
it entered the political arena just a couple of months before the election Uzan’s Genç 
Party managed to garner 7,25% of votes in 2002 general elections. My contention is that 
this effect of dummy for Genç Party identifiers show voters already recognized one-
man-show character of Genç Party and although they identify themselves with the party 
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or the leader Cem Uzan they are more likely to change votes when it comes to other 
elections. 
 
age is slightly insignificant at 5% with significance value of 0,054 and it is 
significant at 10% level. Odds ratio for age is 0,985. This means that as people get older 
they are more likely to keep their votes. Odds of switching votes decrease as age of the 
respondent increases. However, this effect is negligibly small.  
 
When we come to insignificant variables; gender appears to be insignificant with 
a value of 0,555. This tells us that there is no significant difference between males and 
females in terms of odds of voting for the same party in different elections compared to 
changing votes. 
 
Education is found to be an important predictor of party choice. Başlevent et. al. 
(2009) cites Esmer (2002) in arguing that education is repeatedly found to be positively 
correlated with leftist vote choice. I included education variable in order to see whether 
level of education is affecting the vote choice in different elections. However none of 
the categories of the education variable turned out to be significant. Since it is entered 
as a categorical variable estimates are made according to the highest category, higher 
education. This category is insignificant in all levels with a significance value of 0,430. 
Category 1, primary education, and category 2, middle school graduates are found to be 
decreasing the probability of voting for the same party. The odds ratios are 1,038 and 
1,530 respectively. However, both categories are insignificant, with significance values 
as high as 0,929 and 0,368, again respectively. Category 3, high school, decreases the 
odds of switching parties in different elections by a factor of 0,869 but unfortunately 
this category is insignificant with a very high significance value of 0,756.  
 
religiosity is another insignificant variable with a very high value of significance. 
I find this result pretty surprising. I would expect religiosity to be significant, and 
especially in this data set religiosity is expected to be increasing probability of voting 
for the same party because majority of the respondents, 59,4%, are AKP voters and 
AKP voters are known for their high religiosity. However, this variable turned out to be 
insignificant with a significance value of 0,713. In the next regression model I will use a 
dummy variable, reldum, which I created by grouping religious and very religious 
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people together and coding 1, in contrast to other three categories in the religiosity scale 
as 0. I expect this variable to pick up positive effects of religiosity on the probability of 
voting for the same party in different elections.  
 
Among party identification dummies dypdum, mhpdum and dehapdum are 
insignificant at all levels. Being a DEHAP identifier decreases the odds of switching 
parties in different elections by a factor of 0,402 but unfortunately this variable is 
insignificant with a significance value of 0,222.  
 
Ethnic and religious identity variables also proved to be insignificant. 
Significance values for alevi is 0,541 whereas for kurt it is 0, 124. Both variables are 
insignificant at all levels. This means that being an Alevi or a Kurd does not change the 
probability of voting for the same or different parties in general and local elections.                    
 
Economic variables are expected to be effective on vote choice. I include 
econ_pers (respondents’ evaluations about their family’s economic conditions), 
econ_govt (respondents evaluations about government’s responsibility in their 
economic conditions) and econ_int (interaction of econ_govt and econ_pers variables) 
variables into the model in order to check for the effects of changes in the economic 
conditions that can be attributed to government on the vote choice change between 
general and local elections. As seen on the Variables in the equation table all economic 
variables, including the interaction variable turned out to be insignificant. Significance 
values for econ_pers, econ_govt and econ_int are 0,215; 0,156 and 0,368 respectively. 
 
Since I do not want to let economic variables out of the equation I created new 
variables. It is argued that voters that are happy with government’s economic policies 
are more likely to vote for the government party (Başlevent et.al. 2009) and it is also the 
contention of the second order model that government parties are more likely to lose 
votes in the local elections because voters would like to signal them for their 
unsuccessful policies by switching votes. In order to pick up this effect I created a 
dummy variable, econbad, for people who think that their economic conditions gone 
bad or very bad in the last 12 months. Later I took the interaction of this variable with 
econ_govt. The new variable, called econbad_int, as explained above, is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1, if the respondent thinks economic conditions of his 
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household has gone worse in the last 12 months and if he attributes responsibility for 
this to the government. In the next regression model I will include these new economic 
variables in order to see whether bad economic evaluations of the government affect the 
probability of vote switch in any way.   
6. Second Regression Model 
In this second model I try to incorporate some insignificant variables by making 
some transformations on them. The dependent variable again is the vote_switch. As I 
explained in detail above I created econbad dummy variable and econbad_int by 
multiplying econbad with econ_govt. I include these two new variables along with 
econ_govt instead of econ_pers and econ_int variables. Also I included religiosity 
dummy reldum instead of the original religiosity variable. I am doing these 
transformations because economic variables and religiosity are important predictors of 
vote choice in many studies and I expect them to be influential over change of votes 
between general and local elections. I want to make sure that I operationalized them 
correctly and entered into the model in the right way.  
 
Below you can find regression outputs for the second model. This model is jointly 
significant as the previous one.  Joint significance of the model is 0,00 so we conclude 
that independent variables are jointly significant in predicting the dependent variable. 
 
Table 27: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients for the Second Regression 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 79,903 21 0,000 
Block 79,903 21 0,000 Step 1 
Model 79,903 21 0,000 
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Table 28: Model Summary for the Second Regression 
  -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Step 1 711,991(a) 0,110 0,161 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by 
less than ,001. 
 
 
 
 
Table 29: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for the Second Regression 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 9,786 8 0,280 
 
As explained above Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic shows whether predicted 
values are significantly different from actual values. The null hypothesis is that “there is 
no difference between predicted and observed values” so we would like to fail to reject 
the null hypothesis so that fit between the model and the data is proved. Here 
significance value is 0,280 for Hosmer and Lemeshow and in this case we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis, claiming that the model fits the data. 
 
Table 30: Classification Table for the Second Regression 
Predicted 
vote_switch  Observed 
0 1 
Percentage Correct
0 472 29 94,2 vote_switch 
1 144 38 20,9 Step 1 
Overall Percentage     74,7 
a. The cut value is ,500 
 
 
When we look at the classification table we can see that the model predicts 74,7% 
of the cases correctly. This was also 74,7% for the previous model. So there is no 
difference in the explanatory power of the model. 
 
When we turn to regression results, we see that not much changed from the first 
regression. Significant variables of the previous regression metropolitan, 
vote_candidate, left_right, dypdum, gencdum and otherdum are significant in this new 
model as well. age nearly stays the same, it is slightly insignificant with a significance 
value of 0,064 now. Except for age, changes in significance values and coefficients of 
significant and insignificant variables are ignorable. Coding religiosity as a dummy 
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variable seems to change nothing; reldum is also highly insignificant with significance 
value of 0,791. Dummy for the Kurdish and Alevi identities kurt and alevi are also still 
insignificant in this model. 
Table 31: Variables in the Equation for the Second Regression 
  B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
dummy for metropolitan residence 
(metropolitan) -0,375 0,191 0,050 0,687 
gender -0,125 0,195 0,524 0,883 
age -0,014 0,008 0,064 0,986 
education     0,453   
education(1) 0,058 0,414 0,889 1,060 
education(2) 0,429 0,472 0,363 1,536 
education(3) -0,121 0,451 0,788 0,886 
dummy for respondents with negative view of 
their household's economic conditions 
(econbad) 
0,528 0,422 0,211 1,695 
dummy for respondents' view of 
government's responsibility for economic 
conditions (econ_govt) 
-0,373 0,239 0,119 0,689 
interaction variable for economic variables 
econ_bad*econ_govt (econbad_int) -0,453 0,497 0,361 0,635 
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered yes (vote_candidate)     0,000   
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered no (vote_candidate(1)) -0,542 0,202 0,007 0,581 
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered it depends 
(vote_candidate(2)) 
-1,250 0,309 0,000 0,287 
respondent's left right placement (left_right) -0,112 0,049 0,024 0,894 
dummy for religiosity (reldum) 0,059 0,223 0,791 1,061 
dummy for dyp identifiers (dypdum) 1,196 0,452 0,008 3,305 
dummy for chp identifiers (chpdum) -0,314 0,350 0,370 0,731 
dummy for mhp identifiers (mhpdum) 0,595 0,461 0,197 1,814 
dummy for dehap identifiers (dehapdum) -0,211 0,739 0,775 0,809 
dummy for genc party identifiers (gencdum) 1,708 0,453 0,000 5,515 
dummy for other parties identifiers 
(otherdum) 0,721 0,285 0,011 2,056 
dummy for alevi identity (alevi) -0,275 0,451 0,542 0,759 
dummy for kurd identity (kurt) -0,636 0,403 0,114 0,529 
Constant 0,917 0,651 0,159 2,501 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: metropolitan, gender, age, education, econbad, econ_govt, econbad_int, 
vote_candidate, left_right, reldum, dypdum, chpdum, mhpdum, dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum, alevi, 
kurt. 
 
 
When we look at the economic variables, a similar picture is observed. Dummy 
variable for household economic evaluations, econbad and interaction of econbad and 
econ_govt, econbad_int proved to be insignificant, with significance values of 0,211 
and 0,361 respectively. This means that people whose economic conditions has gone 
worse and who keep the government responsible for this does not show any significant 
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difference in voting for the same party in different elections or switching their votes. 
econ_govt also proved insignificant however, its significance value is 0,119. This tells 
me that if other economic variables are dropped from the model this variable could turn 
to be significant.  
 
7. The Last Regression 
Below I provided the last regression model output; it includes all previous 
variables only this time I left econ_govt and excluded all other economic variables. 
 
Table 32: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
ofr the Last Regression      Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 78,274 19 0,000 
Block 78,274 19 0,000 Step 1 
Model 78,274 19 0,000 
 
Table 33: Model Summary for the Last Regression 
  -2 Log likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
Step 1 713,621(a) 0,108 0,158 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by 
less than ,001. 
 
 
Table 34: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test for the Last Regression 
  Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 13,502 8 0,096 
 
 
 
In these outputs, there are two things to note here: First is the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow statistic. For the first time in this series of models Hosmer and Lemeshow is 
significant at 10%. This means that fit of the model to the data is questionable, even 
though at the 10%. 
 
Secondly, in the equation all independent variables have the same signs and 
nearly the same magnitudes with previous models. econ_govt turned to be significant at 
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5% after I exclude other economic variables and its effect is as expected. Thinking 
government is responsible for economic conditions decreases the odds of vote switch by 
a factor 0,628. 
 
 
Table 35: Variables in the Equation for the Last Regression 
  B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
dummy for metropolitan residence 
(metropolitan) -0,361 0,190 0,058 0,697 
gender -0,105 0,194 0,589 0,901 
age -0,014 0,008 0,060 0,986 
education     0,460   
education(1) 0,083 0,413 0,840 1,087 
education(2) 0,443 0,471 0,347 1,557 
education(3) -0,101 0,450 0,822 0,904 
dummy for respondents' view of 
government's responsibility for economic 
conditions (econ_govt) 
-0,465 0,207 0,025 0,628 
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered yes (vote_candidate)     0,000   
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered no (vote_candidate(1)) -0,553 0,201 0,006 0,575 
vote for candidate in the municipality 
elections- answered it depends 
(vote_candidate(2)) 
-1,264 0,309 0,000 0,283 
respondent's left right placement (left_right) -0,114 0,049 0,021 0,892 
dummy for religiosity (reldum) 0,072 0,223 0,746 1,075 
dummy for dyp identifiers (dypdum) 1,220 0,450 0,007 3,387 
dummy for chp identifiers (chpdum) -0,315 0,343 0,359 0,730 
dummy for mhp identifiers (mhpdum) 0,583 0,457 0,202 1,792 
dummy for dehap identifiers (dehapdum) -0,176 0,731 0,810 0,839 
dummy for genc party identifiers (gencdum) 1,723 0,442 0,000 5,600 
dummy for other parties identifiers 
(otherdum) 0,716 0,280 0,011 2,046 
dummy for alevi identity (alevi) -0,268 0,449 0,550 0,765 
dummy for kurd identity (kurt) -0,608 0,403 0,131 0,544 
Constant 1,005 0,640 0,116 2,732 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: metropolitan, gender, age, education, econ_govt, vote_candidate, 
left_right,                                                                                    reldum, dypdum, chpdum, mhpdum, 
dehapdum, gencdum, otherdum, alevi, kurt. 
 
Now all regressions are conducted I should provide an interpretation of results and 
see how they fit with the proposed hypotheses:    
8. Interpretation of Results According to Hypotheses 
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age is significant at 10% in all models with an odds ratio of 0,985. This means 
that age has a miniscule, even negligible, effect on vote switch. Aging decreases the 
odds of switching votes in different elections.    
 
gender is highly insignificant in all models. It has no effect on vote switch. 
 
metropolitan is significant at 5% and living in a metropolitan municipality 
decreases the odds of vote switch. It can be argued that in non-metropolitan areas 
people tend to have closer relationships with candidates and this affects party choice 
more. Also given the high ratio of AKP voters in the sample and AKP dominance in 
metropolitan municipalities it is not surprising that metropolitan residence decreases the 
odds of vote switch.  
 
left_right is significant at 5% with an odds ratio around 0,89 in all models. As 
expected as respondents move to the right their odds to change votes decreases.  
 
religiosity variable is unexpectedly and highly insignificant in all models. 
Significance values for this variable are as high as 0,8. This needs an explanation 
because in all voting behavior models religiosity turns out to be a good predictor of vote 
choice in Turkey. Reasons for this variable to be insignificant can be manifold: One of 
the reasons could be the high amount of missing data in the dataset. This warrant is 
valid for all of the analysis actually; the original dataset has 1806 respondents, however 
I could only work with a sample of 683 respondents. One might argue that high level of 
missing data lead to unexpected results. On the other hand, this thinking might not be 
that credible given the fact that any inconsistency in the sampling supposed affect other 
independent variables as well.  
 
Another reason, related with the previous one, can be lack of variance in the 
variable. That is why regression analysis fails to capture effects of this independent 
variable. In the sample only 3% appears to define themselves as without faith in the 
requirements of religion or not having religious faith at all. 69% of the sample is either 
religious or very religious. Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000) remark right wing party voters 
do not differentiate between themselves in terms of religiosity. This might be true in this 
case and a reason for lack of variance in the variable, which is leading to insignificance. 
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Yet another reason can be measurement error, however Başlevent et.al. (2009) using 
same dataset found religion to be a significant predictor of party choice as with other 
studies using same methodology (for instance Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007). This 
also decreases the credibility of measurement error explanation and leaves the question 
in the air as to why this variable is insignificant.   
 
vote_candidate variable also meet the expectations and turned out to be significant 
in all models at 1%. In line with the expectations responding “no” to the relevant 
question, which is saying “I will not vote for the candidate but for the party”, decreases 
odds of vote switch considerably with compared to responding yes.  Also responding “it 
depends” decreases the odds of vote switch too with a factor of 0,283. 
 
For party identification dummies; DYP and other parties’ identifier dummies, 
dypdum and otherdum turned out to be significant as expected and their effects increase 
the odds of vote switch with compared to the reference category AKP identifiers. DYP 
and other parties’ identifiers are more likely to change their party choice. Genc Party 
dummy, gencdum, also showed an expected effect. This dummy is significant and as 
expected GP identifiers are more likely to change their votes. As indicated this is 
because GP is a party that is identified with its leader and does not have any cadres or 
grassroots mechanisms. It is expected that even GP identifiers would find it hard to vote 
for GP in local elections. Other party dummies are insignificant but the directions of 
coefficients are right.  If the variables were significant CHP and DEHAP identifiers are 
expected to be less likely to change their votes with compared to AKP identifiers.  
 
Identity variables alevi and kurt are expected to decrease odds of a vote switch in 
the elections however they both turned out to be insignificant. According to this data 
being Kurd or an Alevi does not effect decision on vote change in different elections.  
 
Another problematic point in the analysis is the insignificance of economic 
condition variables. Neither personal economic conditions (econ_pers) nor 
government’s responsibility (econ_govt) is found significant. Their interaction 
(econ_int) also turns out to be insignificant. Dummy coded economic variable econbad 
and its interaction with econ_govt, econbad_int also did not improve the position. When 
entered to the model by itself econ_govt turns to be significant and decreases the odds 
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of party switch as expected, however this time Hosmer and Lemeshow statistic becomes 
significant at 10% level, putting doubts on the validity of the model.  
 
Here I should cite three studies on voting behavior. Başlevent et.al (2005 and 
2009) and Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007). These studies on Turkish voting behavior 
in national elections use logistic regression analysis in order to distinguish between 
factors affecting vote choice of voters. Başlevent et. al. (2009) uses the same dataset 
used in this dissertation. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) use data from their own 
panel study. About the effects of economic variables they reach different conclusions. 
Başlevent et. al. in both studies found economic variables to be significant, however 
Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu argue that economic evaluation about the past or the future 
does not shape vote choice of voters, especially for two big parties AKP and CHP. If we 
take this as reference than economic variables showing insignificant values can be 
acceptable. However, the same data suggests impact on vote choice in Başlevent et. al.’s 
(2009) analysis. Whether we can interpret these results simply as economic variables 
having no effect on vote change in different elections, or whether we should suspect 
from a model specification problem is a question to be answered.     
 
Last but not least education proves to be insignificant at all models at all levels. 
This is also something to think about. Since we know that low education level voters are 
more likely to vote for AKP (Başlevent et.al. 2009) it would not be wrong to expect that 
low education levels decrease the odds of vote switch. In the models, however, 
education categories not only turn to be insignificant but also their signs are different 
from expected. Low and middle education categories increase odds of vote switch 
according to their odds ratios. It should be noted that Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu (2007) 
found education to be insignificant over vote choice between AKP and CHP. If 
education is not effective on party vote choice, then it might not be that surprising that it 
turns out to be insignificant on vote switch.  
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
This thesis aims to understand patterns of voting behavior in Turkish local 
elections and its relationship with national elections. While doing this the second order 
election model (Reif and Schmitt 1980) is used as a theoretical framework modeling the 
relationship patterns between different levels of elections. Local elections are often 
portrayed to be of secondary importance with respect to national contests, however, 
especially in the Turkish context there is no systematic analysis of the relationship 
between the two levels of elections. What I have done here is looked at this relationship 
from the second order elections perspective using data at two different levels: At the 
aggregate level I used voter turnout since the 1961 national elections, because there is 
no systematic data about local elections comparable to national election results before 
the 1963 local elections. I also used the vote shares of parties in both elections order to 
calculate comparative fragmentation, volatility and Effective number of parties (ENP) 
indices (Chapter III).  
 
At the individual level I used survey data from the Survey of Electoral Intentions 
conducted in December 2003 by TÜSES and Veri Araştırma,. This survey data has been 
used in previous publications (Başlevent et. al. 2009, Tüses 2004) and is conducted by a 
reputable polling company.  Therefore, I find it credible to use. I created a model with 
the dependent variable defined as the vote switch of the respondents between two 
different elections, past national elections and the upcoming local elections. Factors 
affecting vote switch in these elections have tried to be accounted for with this model. I 
used binary logistic regression in order to test these factors.  
 
 83
According to the second order elections theory people tend to care less about 
second order elections because “less is at stake”.  The second order elections model 
depends on some assumptions about the nature of second order elections. As mentioned 
before these assumptions are:  
 
i. Turnout is lower in second order elections 
ii. Minor parties gain votes against the losses of the government parties in 
second order elections, but voters turn back to their original positions at 
the next first order election 
iii. Government losses are more pronounced in the midterm period 
iv. Outcome is strongly related with incumbent popularity and national issues 
dominate the elections rather than election specific issues (Norris 1997). 
  
I tried to test these assumptions using the above mentioned data analysis. Before 
that the historical development of the Turkish local administration and its basic 
characteristics are provided (Chapter II). Historically, the importance of local 
government is very low in the Turkish state. A strong center tradition not only 
hampered civil society but also does not permit local authority to flourish out of the 
control of the center. Local authorities do not have the financial means and bureaucratic 
power to deliver to the people. This reflected itself in the outlook against local elections. 
From the voters’ side participation is lower; in some cases it is as low as 20% less than 
turnout in general elections. From the politicians’ perspective local elections are not 
political events that are important in their own right, but are viewed as a corollary of 
national politics. Çitçi et.al. (2001) shows the characteristics of local elections by 
analyzing elections between 1963 and 1999 and these characteristics clearly show the 
subservient character of local elections to national politics. 
 
However, one should note changes in the characteristics too. For instance, until 
the 1980s local elections were used as instruments to alter government formation at the 
national stage. However, after 1980s these elections changed character and came to be 
recognized as large public opinion polls. Although still far from valued at its own right, 
this change is significant in itself. Turnout rates on average also show a rise for local 
elections especially in the 1990s. One lesson to be drawn from the historical analysis is 
that these changes in the character of local elections are taking place in hand with 
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changes in the status of local administration. Turkey has been urbanizing rapidly since 
the 1950s so that by the 1980s problems with urbanization became unignorable. 
Significant changes have been made in the laws that relatively strengthen local 
administration units.  These changes not only increased interest in them, but also 
reflected itself in increased turnout rates by the voters. 
 
In Chapter II I try to test some assumptions of the second order model according 
to Turkish local elections.  The analysis of turnout rates shows two things.  First, 
although turnout rates are low in local elections compared to national ones when looked 
at election by election, averages by decade are very close. It is even higher in two 
elections after the 1990s. Secondly, when compared with many European countries, 
differences between local and national elections are miniscule, even negligible.  
Therefore, the first assumption of the second order model that “turnout is always less in 
second order elections” is not sustainable in the Turkish context.  
 
Also in Chapter II, I test the assumption that “government (or big) parties lose 
votes, and small parties gain in return” by using aggregate level vote shares data. I 
calculated fragmentation, volatility and ENP indices using vote shares. The basic 
assumption here is that we expect all these indicators of voter fragmentation to increase 
if the assumption of second order elections is to hold true. However, it is seen that all 
indicators either show more fragmentation for national elections or they are the same. 
Moreover, these indicators move together for both elections, showing that when there is 
fragmentation in the electorate it is reflected both in national and local elections at the 
same time. These indicators also fail to validate the assumptions of the second order 
model for Turkish local elections. It is more like voters are using local election to signal 
or validate national trends, rather than showing different behavior in local elections.. In 
this sense it can be argued that more than second order contests, Turkish local elections 
resemble Anderson and Ward’s (1996) barometer elections. 
 
In Chapter III, I constructed a binary logistic regression model in order to test for 
factors affecting vote choice in different elections. It is hard to say that this model 
directly tests second orderness of local elections because the data at hand does not 
include questions directed at voters investigating their evaluation of local elections 
compared to national elections or questions directed at local issue factors influencing 
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vote choice. However, the data set includes vote choices for the last elections and vote 
intention for upcoming local elections.  In addition, the model I constructed investigates 
differences in this vote choice by using independent variables pertaining to major 
factors that are known to affect vote choice like the socio-demographic variables of age, 
gender, education, as well as religiosity and economic evaluations of respondents. 
Respondents’ intention to vote for the candidate as opposed to the party is also included 
along with traditional left-right self-placement of respondents.  The effect of party 
identification is also controlled for through a dummy variable.            
 
Interpretations of this model and independent variables are provided in Chapter 
IV. Here I would like to reiterate that this model does not directly test second order 
effects in local elections.  However, through evaluation of significant and insignificant 
variables we can generate ideas about national election – local election relationships. I 
would like to direct attention to three independent variables in the model: In the model 
left-right placements turns out to be significant. This can be a sign of the dominance of 
national issues in voting decisions.  Freire (2004) argues that the effect of ideology in 
second order elections is less pronounced. On the other hand the vote-candidate variable 
is significant, meaning that a candidate’s personality is influential for people in their 
decision to change their votes. This can be interpreted as issue or election specific 
variables to be affective in voting decisions.  The economic evaluations of respondents 
turn out to be insignificant. If this is not a model specification problem and economic 
evaluations really does not affect vote change between national and local elections, then 
it means that some national issues are not that influential on second order vote 
decisions. This tells us that things are not that simplistic as assumed by the second order 
elections model; that national issues always dominate the scene and election specific 
issues are not significant.  
In the conclusion it would be appropriate to discuss strengths and weaknesses of 
this analysis. The main strength and potential use of this study comes from its subject 
matter. It is already mentioned that election studies is relatively limited in Turkish 
political science literature. Local election studies within this literature comprise a nearly 
negligible space. I believe that conducting a study in this area is a contribution in itself. 
Also, this study aims to pass beyond previous studies on the subject through making 
analysis of local elections by quantitative methodology. To the best of my knowledge, 
relationship between national and local election results is never studied systematically 
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before. This study is an attempt in this end and can be regarded as a valuable 
contribution within the confines of this attempt.   
 
The study is prone to limitations and weaknesses though. Main limitation is due to 
the survey data used in the study for the individual level analysis. I used TÜSES 2003 
survey which includes questions about party choice in local elections as well as vote 
intention in national elections. As discussed before, working with voting intention data 
instead of actual vote choices is likely to increase measurement error and hence affect 
the results of the analysis. Secondly, applying surveys about local vote intention can be 
all the more problematic. If the surveys are applied in a time where there is no election 
coming up in the near future it is highly likely that local vote intention and national vote 
intention would contaminate each other. Respondents in such a survey are likely to 
respond with the same party choices, without thinking about alternatives. It can be 
argued that local vote intention would be more contaminated because people mostly 
think about general economic and political issues in their mind while answering the 
questions, rather than local issues.  
 
Another limitation is the appropriateness of survey questions for the study. In the 
introduction it was mentioned that in the TÜSES survey there are questions about 
people’s perceptions of autonomy of local administration like “Do you think it’s a good 
thing for your mayor to be a member of the governing party?” and questions about the 
degree of autonomy for the local administration. Most of these questions cannot be used 
in the analysis mainly because they lack responsibility attribution. Since questions are 
not explicitly linked with vote choice they could not be operationalized as independent 
variables in the model. Also there are not any questions directly investigating if and 
how voters differentiate between local and national elections while casting their votes in 
different elections. For these reasons I have repeatedly underscored that the individual 
level analysis in this study is not directly investigating second orderness. Rather, it is a 
preliminary study of factors affecting Turkish voters’ different vote choices for different 
elections.  
       
I would like to draw two general conclusions.  For the second order elections 
model it is already documented that the model does not fulfill its all assumptions in sub-
national elections as it did in the European Parliament elections. Pallares and Keating 
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(2003) and Freire (2004) argued for a need to modify the model for the Spanish and 
Portugese cases they investigated. My analysis here also confirms that the model does 
not fare well with local elections. In the Turkish case, nearly all assumptions of the 
model are violated. Only dominance of national issues in local elections seems to hold 
and it is apparent that we do not need a second order elections model to conclude that.  
 
How can we study voting behavior in local elections then? In an ideal world a 
nation-wide panel study that covers a series of national and local elections and 
conducted both as a pre-election and post-election survey would be very useful for 
investigating local voting behavior in relation to national vote. It would be better if the 
surveys include questions explicitly asking for factors influential on voter’s party choice 
in local and national elections separately, including economic, socio-political and 
conjectural factors at the national and local level. Reasons for party choice change over 
elections should also be asked. Voters’ expectations from the local administration, how 
much power they attribute to local politics, their views about decentralization of local 
administration should also be included.  On the other hand, one should accept that such 
a tailor-made survey series would be enormously time consuming and costly 
 
The conclusion for the Turkish local elections would be that, although the 
dominance of national issues is expected to hold as it does for all other countries, one 
cannot dismiss the growing importance of local elections in the face of national ones. If 
continuing urbanization is accompanied by further decentralization, it would not be 
surprising to see local issues dominating local elections in future elections. 
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